News

FAAST Blast — Week of Sep 03, 2018

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 09/10/2018 - 09:21

FAAST Blast — SAIB for Dye Penetrant Testing, Workforce Symposium, ADS-B Out Deadline, A Kaleidoscope Community
Notice Number: NOTC8021

FAAST Blast — Week of Sep 03, 2018 – Sep 09, 2018
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

New SAIB Highlights Proper Use of Liquid Penetrant Inspection

In light of a recent accident involving an inflight propeller failure and separation, the FAA issued a new Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) that stresses the need for continued diligence in the use of liquid penetrant inspection methods involving fluorescent dye (Type I) and visible dye (Type II) penetrants. During the examination of the failed propeller, there were remnants of visible dye penetrant (red dye) material found in the bolt holes indicating an inadequate cleaning after a previous inspection. According to the SAIB, residual red dye can affect the quality of future inspections and can fill voids, flaws, and cracks making it extremely difficult to remove. Visible dye residue contamination of fluorescent penetrant fluid is also known to significantly reduce the brightness of fluorescent indication and can mask the fluorescent agent, causing flaws in the part to be minimized or missed at the next inspection.

To prevent this, the FAA recommends adhering to proper pre- and post-inspection cleaning methods and materials to ensure any residual developer, penetrant, and/or visible dye residues are removed which could affect subsequent inspections. For more details, see SAIB CE-18-26 here: go.usa.gov/xPxUt.

FAA Aviation Workforce Symposium on Sep 13

Are you interested in how the United States will attract our future aviation workforce? Join the conversation and register now for the September 13, 2018 FAA Aviation Workforce Symposium at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport http://bit.ly/2MOoGNb.

Only 16 Months Until ADS-B Out Equipage Deadline

This is a friendly reminder that the ADS-B Out equipage deadline is quickly approaching. You have 16 months left to equip your aircraft. Don’t get left in the hangar! http://bit.ly/2A8K0Xg .

A Kaleidoscope Community

The September/October 2018 issue of FAA Safety Briefing explores the important role of community in general aviation and acquaints you with a wide range of organizations that can be part of your aviation world now or at some point down the road. Like making patterns in a kaleidoscope, you can shape and continually re-shape your own unique aviation community in ways that support your evolving aviation experience and interests. Get more acquainted by reading the article “Our Kaleidoscope Community,” the lead feature in the September/October 2018 issue of FAA Safety Briefing here: adobe.ly/2C0pvO1. You can read the entire issue at 1.usa.gov/FAA_ASB.

Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors, www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing
Address questions or comments to: [email protected].
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or https://twitter.com/FAASafetyBrief

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of Aug 20, 2018

FAA & FAASTeam News - Tue, 08/28/2018 - 11:57

FAAST Blast — Rotorcraft Safety Conference, Runway Safety Summit, Managing Instructional Risk
Notice Number: NOTC7985

FAAST Blast — Week of Aug 20, 2018 – Aug 26, 2018
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

2018 Rotorcraft Safety Conference

The FAA will host the 2018 International Rotorcraft Safety Conference in an effort to reduce the national helicopter accident rate, particularly among small operators. The three-day, free event, featuring nearly 35 presentations and seminars, will offer Inspection Authorization and FAA AMT and WINGS credits. The conference will take place October 23-25, 2018, at the Hurst Conference Center in Hurst, Texas, a Fort Worth suburb. The conference will be an excellent opportunity for pilots, mechanics, and other stakeholders to review, discuss, and consider new ways to help improve rotorcraft safety. For more details, including registration information, go to www.faahelisafety.org.

FAA Safety Summit Addresses Wrong Surface Events

The FAA hosted a safety summit this week to address the issue of wrong surface events. From fiscal year 2016 to 2018, there were 596 actual or attempted wrong landing/approach events and 483 actual or attempted wrong surface departure events. GA operations accounted for 86 and 83-percent of these events respectively. The summit gathered top FAA officials and industry stakeholders to discuss wrong surface events as well as assess current and future solutions and mitigation strategies. “Reducing the risks of wrong surface events is one of the FAA’s leading safety priorities,” said FAA Air Traffic Organization COO Teri Bristol during opening remarks. Bristol also stated that the event will ensure the FAA and industry fully understand the factors that are contributing to this risk and will help promote a joint effort to eliminate wrong surface events.

Stay tuned for more on this initiative. You can also check out the article “Is That My Runway?” in the current issue of FAA Safety Briefing and watch a video on wrong surface events here: youtu.be/5II-s_j35cI.

Thinking for Two

Instructional flights are the second largest category of non-commercial fixed wing accidents. Since you, as the instructor, are the pilot in command, you have to do the thinking for both the trainee and yourself. Flight instruction inherently involves multitasking, so your attention is constantly shifting. If you are a flight instructor, then please read the article “Thinking for Two – Managing Instructional Risk” in the July/August 2018 issue here: adobe.ly/2MxXzBr. You can read the entire issue at 1.usa.gov/FAA_ASB.

 

Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors, www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing
Address questions or comments to: [email protected].
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or https://twitter.com/FAASafetyBrief

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

AWAM Now Accepting Scholarship Applications

AskBob News - Wed, 08/15/2018 - 10:35

The Association for Women in Aviation Maintenance is now accepting applications for 2019 awards and scholarships. Applications must be submitted online by Nov. 1.

Last year, AWAM awarded $140,000 in scholarships to 30 recipients.  With the assistance of corporate sponsors, this program continues to grow to support the industry and the needs of the future.

Scholarship opportunities are not only for initial students or women.  Many are for those already working in the field, transitioning from the military, and for men as well.

For more information and to apply, visit http://www.awam.org/scholarships/.  

 

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: News, US

Improper Overhaul and Repair of Aeronautical Anti-friction Bearings by Kornitzky Group LLC, doing business as AeroBearings LLC of Arlington, Texas

AskBob News - Wed, 08/08/2018 - 13:20

Purpose: This SAFO alerts aircraft owners, operators, air agencies, suppliers, distributors, and maintenance technicians of improper maintenance performed by AeroBearings LLC. This maintenance provider previously held Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Agency Certificate No. 8AZR921B for aeronautical anti-friction bearings used in turbine engines, auxiliary power units (APU), rotorcraft drive systems, and accessory applications.
Background: The FAA investigation revealed that AeroBearings LLC conducted work on aeronautical anti-friction bearings used in aircraft engines, APUs, rotorcraft drive systems, and accessory applications without possessing the necessary approved data. As a result, AeroBearings LCC could not determine whether the bearings met the original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM) design specifications. The work accomplished is not compliant with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 43. In March 2018, the FAA revoked AeroBearings LLC’s Air Agency Certificate No. 8AZR921B.
Recommended Action: See SAFO at https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2018/SAFO18008.pdf

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: News, US

Continental Motors Group starts construction of greenfield factory in Mobile, AL

AskBob News - Fri, 08/03/2018 - 15:20

Continental Motors Group Ltd. (CMG), an AVIC International Holding (HK) LTD company (HKEX: 232.HK), announced today that the foundation work for their new manufacturing facility has started.  The new facility will be nearly 275,000 square feet (25,000 m2) with the majority being dedicated to advanced engine and parts manufacturing for all Continental Motors Group product lines. It will be populated with brand new manufacturing equipment and include a special area designated for evaluation of new manufacturing techniques and processes, including additive manufacturing and automation. 

Building a new factory is only one part of the $75 million plan to profoundly transform Continental Motors and the way the company designs, manufactures, certifies, and support products. CMG is also building a new customer and technology development infrastructure that will allow its team members to better focus on building customer satisfaction and develop innovative new products. 

"Continental Motors® has been a big part of the local Mobile community for over 50 years and is pleased with the community support that allows us to renew our commitment to the region and our great team members for many years to come. The "greenfield" facility will modernize our manufacturing processes into a world class, high productivity, vertically integrated center of manufacturing excellence among the aviation cluster in Mobile, Alabama, USA," said Mr. Michael Skolnik, Executive Vice President Global Operations. 

Continental will hold a job fair on August 4, 2018, to meet its immediate recruitment needs and to better inform the public of the career opportunities offered by the aerospace industry. This is another demonstration of Continental Motors' involvement in the community around Mobile Bay and its commitment to participate in Mobile's economic development.  

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: News, US

Michelin introduces MICHELIN PILOT, The high-performance tire for piston and turboprop aircraft

AskBob News - Thu, 08/02/2018 - 10:10

Michelin is launching a high-performance bias tire, the MICHELIN PILOT, a tire designed for propeller-driven aircraft to provide extra-long tire life, exceptional tread life and all-weather protection.
Commenting on the launch, Robert Sevener, global lead for Michelin general aviation tires said: “The Michelin Pilot offers state-of-the-art features for piston and turbo-prop applications, and reflects Michelin’s proven history of developing ultra-high-performance tires.” He added: “Our customers want a deep tread to achieve more landings and a lighter tire to improve fuel efficiency and increase range. The new Pilot tire provides both in this aircraft sector.”
The Michelin Pilot is designed to have extra-long tire life as a result of an improved carcass construction that delivers increased durability and improved resistance to foreign object damage. The tire incorporates the latest high-technology ozone-resistant compounds into the sidewall rubber. The natural contour-mold profile promotes casing equilibrium for improved footprint-pressure distribution in the contact patch. By significantly improving overall tire life, pilots may achieve more take-offs and landings while purchasing fewer tires.
Designed with additional belt plies that strengthen the crown area, the Michelin Pilot helps deliver improved wear and exceptional tread life. The tire’s exclusive manufacturing process creates built-in balance for smooth taxiing and even tire wear, helping to provide true-track taxi, take-offs and landings for propeller-driven aircraft.
The Michelin Pilot tire, crafted with highly-durable rubber compounds, has up to 21 per cent deeper skid depth. A natural contour carcass line reduces ply stresses and the tubeless-tire design reduces the combined tire-wheel weight and helps eliminate tire creep (the tendency of a tire to move around the wheel hub at touchdown). This high-performance bias tire can also be used with a tube, delivering the same enhanced performance to pilots who use tube-type rims.
Long-term ozone and UV light protection incorporated into the tire provides all-weather protection. The two wide grooves in the tire tread evacuate water efficiently on wet runways, and promote excellent resistance to hydroplaning for safer operations in wet-weather conditions.
The Michelin Pilot is currently available in two sizes for the United States, Canada and Europe: 15x6.00-6 6/160 and 5.00-5 6/160. Three additional sizes will be available later in 2018, with the sixth size targeted for 2019. To learn more about aviation tires, visit aircraft.michelin.com

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: News, US

ATP and SchweizerRSG Sign Exclusive Agreement for Technical Publication Distribution Using the ATP Aviation Hub™ Cloud Application

AskBob News - Tue, 07/31/2018 - 09:07

ATP’s Cloud-Based Distribution Will Ensure that Maintainers Have Immediate Access to the Latest Maintenance and Compliance Information for SchweizerRSG aircraft.

BRISBANE, CALIFORNIA – July 9, 2018 – ATP   — the premier provider of information tools and services for the aviation industry — and SchweizerRSG today announced an exclusive partnership to offer maintenance providers the industry’s most advanced technical publication service, which is available as a single source solution that can include airframe, engine and other components. With the partnership, maintenance providers working on 269 series helicopters will be able to dramatically boost productivity while cutting costs and repair times.  

The agreement covers all variants of 269 series helicopters, which are now integrated into ATP® Maintenance Libraries, the industry’s most comprehensive, single-source maintenance and regulatory publication resource. Through the ATP Aviation Hub™ Cloud Application, subscribers have a convenient way to find the most up to date publications required to keep the aircraft safe and airworthy while also preventing costly regulatory lapses. ATP will ensure customers receive the most up-to-date content by distributing any new updates through the company’s daily revision services.

"It was important to Schweizer that a quality, supported platform be selected for the management of the publications to ensure ease of access and use for owners, operators and maintenance providers.  The ATP Maintenance Library enables maintainers to have access to the most current publications, inspection, and repair information for 269 Series aircraft literally at their fingertips," said David Horton, President of SchweizerRSG. "This partnership represents our commitment to timely and required information dissemination through an established channel in the marketplace to support the Schweizer product line,” he added.

Maintenance operations working on 269 Series Helicopters will also benefit from productivity and accessibility tools such as the ATP Aviation Hub™ Mobile App, which provides convenient online and offline access to mission critical maintenance, operating, and regulatory content; and the company’s “Profile & Compliance” tool, which ensures proper compliance tracking for Airworthiness Directives (ADs) and Service Bulletins (SBs).

“By leveraging ATP’s information tools and services, maintenance professionals working on Schweizer series helicopters will be able to service the aircraft better, faster and more accurately in order to ensure optimal safety, reliability and availability,” said Ted Haugner, Vice President of OEM sales for ATP. “This partnership enables SchweizerRSG to leverage our core competencies in serving the specialized information needs of maintenance professionals.”

Under the partnership, SchweizerRSG will take advantage of ATP’s core competencies in advanced content distribution, revision management, publication management, and subscription management for maintenance and technical information. Subscribers will also be supported by ATP’s world-class customer service center, global network of channel partners, and the company’s deep experience in aviation maintenance, operations and regulatory information.

Libraries are available for individual SchweizerRSG models or a complete bundled library covering all SchweizerRSG 269 Series models. All libraries include FAA Airworthiness Directives and manufacturer services bulletins related to the aircraft. Annual subscriptions can be purchased in ATP’s online store for immediate, online access to content or by calling an ATP sales representative.

About SchweizerRSG

SchweizerRSG, is a privately held company that specializes in the support and production of light helicopters.  Specifically, the Schweizer S-300™ and S-333™ and aftermarket support for all models of Schweizer helicopters.  Schweizer RSG is conveniently located at Meacham Airfield in Ft. Worth, TX and has a global network of authorized service centers to meet service and parts needs around the world.

About ATP

ATP is a trusted partner of aviation manufacturers, operators and maintenance providers focused on maximizing the value of aircraft and aviation operations by providing a suite of reference content, airworthiness, diagnostics and reliability services that optimize aircraft availability and operational compliance. Through our 40+ years of experience in the aviation industry we have developed expertise in managing and analyzing content for maintenance, operations, and compliance. We add value through smarter reference content and diagnostics, integrating that information into decision support tools to drive improved decision making and productivity, and advisory services to deliver efficient operations.

For more information, visit ATP.com.

Find us on:
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

###

For More Information,
Contact:
David Perkins

Senior Director of Marketing
ATP
Tel: (+1) 415-330-9544
E-mail: [email protected]

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: News, US

CALLBACK 457 - February 2018

ASRS Callback - Wed, 07/18/2018 - 10:52
Share or Problem viewing / mobile device: CLICK HERE
Issue 457 February 2018 Perplexing passenger circumstances can exist in all shapes and sizes and may develop quickly during flight operations. While many passenger situations are routine, some may be uncommon or even unique. Many pilots and flight attendants have encountered unusual passenger situations that they never would have imagined. Passenger incidents could include illness, injury, misconduct, medical problems, baggage issues, intoxication, confrontation, threatening behavior, or other rare conditions.

Dealing with distinct passenger events may require creative problem solving techniques, clear judgment, quick decisions, and exceptional Crew Resource Management (CRM) by everyone involved, especially if a situation is not addressed by FAR, company policy, or the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). Teamwork is a must.

This month CALLBACK shares six perspectives on one passenger incident and the responsive actions the crew took. Each reporter’s individual account and actions during this single incident may stimulate strong and differing opinions. The ability of ASRS to capture and portray an event from multiple perspectives may, however, provide more clarity to the event than the view perceived through any single lens. Our intent is to illustrate the complexity and urgency that a passenger situation may present to a crew and to stimulate constructive discussion regarding crew actions when dealing with passenger circumstances. The Crew Debriefing This air carrier crew was caught off-guard by a passenger situation just prior to initiating the takeoff. Ensuing communications, misinformation, confusion, assumptions, and decisions at a critical time resulted in a less than desirable outcome that had the potential to become much worse.From the First Officer’s Report:■ The aircraft was in position on the runway for takeoff. A Flight Attendant called and said that they had a problem with a passenger and that they would get back to us. The Flight Attendant then called a second time shortly thereafter saying that they had a passenger who was afraid to fly and wanted to get off the aircraft, and that we needed to go back to the gate.… Flight Attendant B was on the phone relaying information to the Captain. I was monitoring Tower as we were awaiting takeoff clearance and was not in on this phone conversation. I asked the Captain if [the Captain] wanted me to get clearance to clear the runway. [The Captain] said, “No, stay on the runway and see how long it takes to get our takeoff clearance.” Our takeoff clearance came quickly from the Tower, and the Captain said that we were going and pushed the throttles up for takeoff. We found out later in flight that the passenger in question and two or three Flight Attendants were standing in the cabin during takeoff.

This event occurred because sufficient time was not taken to address the Flight Attendants’ concerns about this passenger. Adherence to Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) procedures and taking time to address problems on the ground would have prevented this issue. From the Captain’s Report:
■ While on the runway waiting for takeoff clearance from Tower, the [Purser] called the cockpit and reported to the [Relief Pilot] that they had a panicking passenger who wanted to get off the airplane. I told the Flight Attendant B to tell them that we were on the runway and that it’s too late to get off. [I said,] “We are taking off now.”

After takeoff, the Flight Attendant notified me that they were in the aisle still standing when the takeoff was initiated. I informed them that I was unaware that anyone was standing at the time and that they should have been more specific as to the situation. I believe that, [because]…Flight Attendant B was on the phone relaying the message,…the communication may have been confused or omitted.

The specifics of the situation were not properly communicated, or the specifics did not get communicated because…the [Relief Pilot] was taking the call and transferring the information to me. The [Relief Pilot] also told me that [the Relief Pilot] was unaware of people standing at the time.
From the Relief Pilot’s Report:
■ I was the [Relief Pilot] and was sitting in the First Observer’s seat. In the takeoff position shortly after being cleared for takeoff, the Purser called the cockpit. The First Officer (FO) took [that] call and reported that there was a problem with a passenger and that they’d call back. I answered the next call. The Flight Attendant reported that a passenger wanted to get off the plane immediately and was very upset. I reported this to the Captain after I told the Flight Attendant that I’d call back in a moment. There was very little cockpit discussion before I called to the back to get a status on the passenger. I was informed, I believe, by the Purser that the passenger was adamant about getting off the airplane.

The Purser stated that we needed to go back to the gate and remove the passenger. I hung up the phone and related verbatim what was said to me by the Purser. At that point, the Captain stated that we weren’t going back to the gate for that and, without hesitation or further discussion, pushed up the power, [engaged the autothrottles], and off we went. From the Purser’s Report:
■ During taxi a passenger approached [the door] and stated that [the passenger] must deplane. The passenger was suffering and showing signs of anxiety and panic attack. The passenger continued to insist [that the passenger] must deplane and could not travel. [I] made a call to the cockpit to advise [the Captain] of the situation. [I] advised that I was experiencing a situation in the cabin with a passenger unable to go through with travel who was experiencing and exhibiting extreme anxiety and panic. I further advised my assessment that we needed to return to the gate. The response was affirmative. Thinking that arrangements were being made to return to the gate, I and two other Flight Attendants continued to calm the passenger in efforts to get [the passenger] back to a seat as we taxied to the gate. The next thing I knew, the engines were revving, and we were speeding down the runway for takeoff while I, the passenger, and two other Flight Attendants were standing in the galley in total shock…and attempting to secure ourselves. As soon as we were able, [we] assisted the passenger to the closest empty passenger seat, and I took my jumpseat.

What could prevent this from occurring in the future, in my opinion, would be better communication coming from the cockpit in determining the current condition of a special situation occurring in the cabin before forging ahead with the decision to take off. From the B Flight Attendant’s Report:■ As we were taxiing out for takeoff,…a passenger was emotionally distressed and approached Flight Attendant A at Door 2L. [The passenger] told [Flight Attendant A] that [the passenger] wanted to get off the aircraft and was having a panic attack. I was Flight Attendant B.… I went to [the Purser] and informed [the Purser] of the situation. [The Purser] then called the Captain to inform [the Captain]. I went back to Door 2L and tried to calm [the passenger]…down. [The passenger] was trembling and crying. The [Purser] was with me in the mid-galley when Flight Attendant [E] came and told us that the Captain informed them [that] we were taking off. We instantly took off! We seated the passenger in the nearest available seat. We didn’t have time to sit in our jumpseats.
From the E Flight Attendant’s Report:■ A passenger suffered an extreme panic attack during the takeoff phase and wanted to get off the airplane. The passenger was standing in the business class galley assisted by Flight Attendant A and the Purser. The passenger did not speak any English, and I assisted with translation. The Pilots were advised of the situation, but the takeoff went on with the three Flight Attendants and the passenger standing in the business class galley. Quickly we moved the passenger to the nearest open seat.NASA ASRS Director’s Retirement
After 37 years at NASA Ames Research Center and 21 years as NASA ASRS Director, I have decided to retire from government civil service at the end of February. It has been my distinct honor and pleasure to work with the amazing aviation safety community that includes so many colleagues and friends from the FAA, the NTSB, and the numerous organizations that represent all of you who report to the ASRS. It has been my privilege to work with the dedicated staff of the ASRS, who commit themselves each day to discovering the safety gems hidden in the multitude of reports sent to the ASRS from pilots, controllers, dispatchers, flight attendants, maintenance technicians, ground workers, and others. I have been fortunate to convey the concept of confidential safety reporting to aviation organizations both in this nation and in other countries and industries. To all of you everywhere with whom I have crossed paths, I will miss you dearly. I thank each and every one of you for your tireless contributions to the process of improving aviation safety, and I support you and your efforts to continue the important work of transforming safety information into safety changes that will prevent accidents.

My sincerest regards,
Linda Connell Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 457 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States.
Learn more »December 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,617 General Aviation Pilots 1,042 Controllers 476 Flight Attendants 409 Military/Other 306 Dispatchers 193 Mechanics 145 TOTAL 7,188 2017 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 19 Airport Facility or Procedure 10 ATC Equipment or Procedure 16 Company Policy 2 Hazard to Flight 2 Other 2 TOTAL 51 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 457


NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

CALLBACK 458 - March 2018

ASRS Callback - Wed, 07/18/2018 - 10:52
Share or Problem viewing / mobile device: CLICK HERE
Issue 458 March 2018 This month, CALLBACK again offers the reader a chance to “interact” with the information given in a selection of ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story,” you will find report excerpts describing an event up to a point where a specific decision must be made or some immediate action must be taken. You may then exercise your own judgment to make a decision or determine a possible course of action that would best resolve the situation.

The selected ASRS reports may not give all the information you want, and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to refine your aviation judgment and decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story…” you will find the actions that were taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action, and there may not be a “right” answer. Our intent is to stimulate thought, training, and discussion related to the type of incidents that were reported. The First Half of the StoryGet out of My Way  C152 Pilot’s Report■ While cruising at a VFR altitude of 4,500 feet, the engine experienced a sudden, rapid, and unusual 500 RPM drop in power without input.… I made the decision to land at the nearest airport. Center was providing VFR flight following and was notified of my situation. The procedure of verifying…correct engine control positions failed to increase RPM. The remaining engine output was sufficient to maintain altitude, but I judged it to be unreliable and opted to not reduce power for fear it would cause further undesirable operation. I was cleared to switch to CTAF and announced my intentions to land on the active runway. After slipping to lose excess altitude, it became apparent that a helicopter was on the [approach] end of the runway. I requested that he please move, [but I received] no response.
What Would You Have Done?
Sliding Visibility  PA46 Pilot’s Report ■ I had never experienced conditions [like this] in my life. It was CAVU, but due to the snowfall the night prior and gusty winds of 30+ knots, the blowing snow created visibility problems…on the surface.… As I lined up [for takeoff], I was told that the RVR at…the [touchdown] end was around 2,400 feet and, at the rollout area, 4,000 feet. I asked how far down the runway I needed to obtain the better RVR and was told, “All the way to the end.”

I was holding in position on the runway and was cleared for takeoff, but I decided to delay takeoff due to the visibility, so I told the Tower. Visibility was so poor on the ground that [Tower] had zero ability to tell where I was. I was told that I could hold in place, but that there was a Learjet on a 5-mile final, indicating that there was some urgency for my departure.

I [then] had a “break” in the weather and decided to give it a shot. As I accelerated, I lost visual [references] due to snow on the runway, [and] also lost my bearings.
What Would You Have Done?
Just One More  C172 Flight Instructor’s Report ■ I was training a student who has approximately 30 hours and has soloed three times. We were doing a training flight in the traffic pattern working on short and soft field takeoffs and landings. For the short field landings, I was giving the scenario that a previous student of mine had received during his private pilot checkride. [His] examiner had wanted him to land on the threshold, so that is the same scenario that my student and I were practicing. We had performed nine takeoffs and landings, and he was doing very well with the spot landings and short field procedures.

In the beginning, I was following…closely on the controls to ensure the proper threshold crossing height for the point where we were landing. As the lesson progressed, I eased off of the controls to allow him to be more in control. After the ninth landing, I knew it was about time to finish up for the evening. My student asked if we could do just one more takeoff and landing.
What Would You Have Done?
A Limit of Expertise  A320 Captain’s Report ■ The ATIS wind was reported at 280/11G19. The approach was normal and uneventful. At around 800 or 900 feet we had a little bit of a tailwind, but the wind was shifting in both direction and speed. The last wind that I saw was out of the west at maybe 6 to 8 knots. At less than 40 feet, somewhere around 30 feet, both the First Officer and I felt the plane start to sink a little. Not unusual…for the spring and summer. I increased the angle of attack to slow the sink rate and left the thrust in the climb detent to ensure an increase in thrust as I increased back pressure. At 20 feet the airplane was still sinking. I continued to increase back pressure and left the thrust in all the way to landing. The airplane was not responding to my control inputs, and…I felt the side stick hit the aft stop.
What Would You Have Done?The Rest of the Story
Get out of My Way  C152 Pilot’s Report The Reporter's Action:■ Unsure of the plane’s ability to climb during a go-around, I decided to land on the parallel taxiway that was clear of traffic and obstructions. I made an announcement on CTAF that we would land on the taxiway. Unsure of the helicopter’s intentions on the runway, I asked that he depart to the right and away from the taxiway. A slightly faster than normal landing was made without aircraft damage.

Contacting CTAF [had been] delayed by a few seconds because we did not have the CTAF frequency.… My passenger was another pilot and was trying to tune [CTAF] while I…looked for the airport and possible alternative landing sites. This delay might have caused the near conflict on the runway. The solution of landing at the nearest airport was complicated by lack of time to communicate with traffic in the area, and the only clear landing spot was the taxiway.
First Half of Situation #2
Sliding Visibility  PA46 Pilot’s Report The Reporter's Action:■ I could tell that I had slid off the side of the runway but had not hit anything. I cut power and contacted the Tower. I asked for a tug from the FBO. After inspection of my plane in the hangar, it was confirmed that I had not hit anything, nor had I done any damage to my propeller, landing gear, or airplane.

In hindsight, I allowed the fact that planes were departing from another runway to influence my decision to attempt a departure, and I allowed ATC comments about an approaching Learjet to rush me. I should have recognized that [it] was not safe to depart.… This was clearly my error as PIC, but…communicating that a Learjet was approaching helped create an environment where there was a “call-to-action.”
First Half of Situation #3
Just One More  C172 Flight Instructor’s Report The Reporter's Action:■ I agreed. The sun had set and we were beginning to lose some of our light.… As we turned onto final, the lighting system was not turned on.… When we approached short final I heard him keying on the lights.… He had turned them on high intensity.… I began reaching for the hand held microphone to turn down the lights.… When I got the microphone and got them keyed down,…I made a quick glance over to his airspeed indicator to verify that he was at the proper speed, and then I put the microphone back so my hands were free. When I looked back,… I knew we had gotten a little lower than I would have liked, and we then felt the right tire hit the threshold light.… We were able to touch down straight, on the main wheels, and in the center of the runway.… I should have stuck with my instinct that we had done enough takeoffs and landings and that any more could be detrimental to the progress made.First Half of Situation #4
A Limit of Expertise  A320 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action:■ The last 10 feet or so…just felt like the bottom fell out. The airplane landed hard and bounced back into the air.… I heard the auto “PITCH” call and lowered the nose to allow the plane to land firmly on the runway. The First Officer quickly reported a loss of 30 knots over the runway to the Tower. Taxi in was normal. As we taxied in I looked at the G-meter on the systems display, and no indication was observed.… I asked [the Flight Attendants] if they needed the paramedics, and they said, “No.”…

[After] the First Officer…returned from the post flight walk around [inspection], he informed me of a scrape on the bottom of the fuselage just before the tail. I went downstairs with the maintenance folks to inspect the damage.… The aft lavatory drain mast had a scrape as well.
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 458 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report » January 2018 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,003 General Aviation Pilots 1,060 Controllers 467 Flight Attendants 442 Military/Other 310 Mechanics 238 Dispatchers 148 TOTAL 7,668 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 6 Airport Facility or Procedure 4 ATC Equipment or Procedure 9 Hazard to Flight 6 Other 7 TOTAL 32 NOTE TO READERS:  ■ or ■ Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 458

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

CALLBACK 459 - April 2018

ASRS Callback - Wed, 07/18/2018 - 10:51
Share or Problem viewing / mobile device: CLICK HERE
Issue 459 April 2018 The Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) is the electronic equivalent to the pilot’s traditional flight bag. It contains electronic data and hosts EFB applications, and it is generally replacing the pilots’ conventional paper products in the cockpit. The EFB has demonstrated improved capability to display aviation information such as airport charts, weather, NOTAMs, performance data, flight releases, and weight and balance.

The EFB platform, frequently a tablet device, introduces a relatively new human-machine interface into the cockpit. While the EFB provides many advantages and extensive improvements for the aviation community in general and for pilots specifically, some unexpected operational threats have surfaced during its early years.

ASRS has received reports that describe various kinds of EFB anomalies. One typical problem occurs when a pilot “zooms,” or expands the screen to enlarge a detail and thereby unknowingly “slides” important information off the screen, making it no longer visible. A second type of problem manifests itself in difficulty operating the EFB in specific flight or lighting conditions, while yet another relates to EFB operation in a particular phase of flight. This month CALLBACK addresses some common problems that pilots have experienced during the EFB’s adolescence. The Disappearing Departure Course This A320 crew was given a vector to intercept course and resume the departure procedure, but the advantage that the EFB provided in one area generated a threat in another.From the Captain’s Report:■ Air Traffic Control (ATC) cleared us to fly a 030 heading to join the GABRE1 [Departure]. I had never flown this Standard Instrument Departure (SID). I had my [tablet] zoomed in on the Runway 6L/R departure side so I wouldn’t miss the charted headings. This put Seal Beach [VOR] out of view on the [tablet]. I mistakenly asked the First Officer to sequence the Flight Management Guidance Computer (FMGC) between GABRE and FOGEX.
From the First Officer’s Report:
■ During departure off Runway 6R at LAX [while flying the] GABRE1 Departure, ATC issued, “Turn left 030 and join the GABRE1 Departure.” This was the first time for both pilots performing this SID and the first time departing this runway for the FO.… Once instructed to join the departure on the 030 heading, I extended the inbound radial to FOGEX and inserted it into the FMGC. With concurrence from the Captain, I executed it. ATC queried our course and advised us that we were supposed to intercept the Seal Beach VOR 346 radial northbound. Upon review, both pilots had the departure zoomed in on [our tablets] and did not have the Seal Beach [VOR] displayed.
Hidden Holding Patterns This B757 Captain received holding instructions during heavy traffic. While manipulating his EFB for clarification, he inadvertently contributed to an incorrect holding entry.
■ [We were] asked to hold at SHAFF intersection due to unexpected traffic saturation.… While setting up the FMC and consulting the arrival chart, I expanded the view on my [tablet] to find any depicted hold along the airway at SHAFF intersection. In doing so, I inadvertently moved the actual hold depiction…out of view and [off] the screen.

The First Officer and I only recall holding instructions that said to hold northeast of SHAFF, 10 mile legs. I asked the First Officer if he saw any depicted hold, and he said, “No.” We don’t recall instructions to hold as depicted, so not seeing a depicted hold along the airway at SHAFF, we entered a right hand turn. I had intended to clarify the holding side with ATC, however there was extreme radio congestion and we were very close to SHAFF, so the hold was entered in a right hand turn.

After completing our first 180 degree turn, the controller informed us that the hold at SHAFF was left turns. We said that we would correct our holding side on the next turn. Before we got back to SHAFF for the next turn, we were cleared to [the airport]. Name that Taxiway This B737 Captain has obviously encountered frustration while using his moving map. Although the specific incident is not cited, the Captain clearly identifies an EFB operational problem and offers a practical solution for the threat.
■ In [our] new version of [our EFB chart manager App],… a setting under Airport Moving Map (AMM)…says, “Set as default on landing,” [and I cannot]…turn it off. If [I] turn it off, it turns itself back on. This is bad.… It should be the pilot’s choice whether or not to display it at certain times—particularly after landing. Here’s the problem with the AMM: When you zoom out, the taxiway names disappear.

Consider this scenario: As you turn off of the runway at a large airport, you look down at the map (which is the AMM, not the standard taxi chart, because the AMM comes on automatically, and [I] cannot turn that feature off). You get some complicated taxi instructions and then zoom out the AMM [to] get a general, big-picture idea of where you’re supposed to go. But when [I] zoom out the AMM, taxiway names disappear.… [I] have to switch back to the standard taxi chart and zoom and position that chart to get the needed information. That’s a lot of heads-down [tablet] manipulation immediately after exiting the runway, and it’s not safe.

[Pilots should have] control over whether or not to automatically display the AMM after landing. The AMM may work fine at a small airport, but at a large airport when given taxi instructions that are multiple miles long, the AMM is useless for big-picture situational awareness. Subtle and Sobering This A319 crew had to manage multiple distractions prior to departure. An oversight, a technique, and a subtle EFB characteristic subsequently combined to produce the unrecognized controlled flight toward terrain.■ We received clearance from Billings Ground, “Cleared…via the Billings 4 Departure, climb via the SID.…” During takeoff on Runway 10L from Billings, we entered IMC. The Pilot Flying (PF) leveled off at approximately 4,600 feet MSL, heading 098 [degrees]. We received clearance for a turn to the southeast…to join J136. We initiated the turn and then requested a climb from ATC. ATC cleared us up to 15,000 feet. As I was inputting the altitude, we received the GPWS alert, “TOO LOW TERRAIN.” Immediately the PF went to Take Off/Go Around (TO/GA) Thrust and pitched the nose up. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) confirmed TO/GA Thrust and hit the Speed Brake handle…to ensure the Speed Brakes were stowed. Passing 7,000 feet MSL, the PM announced that the Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) was 6,500 feet within 10 nautical miles of the Billings VOR. The PF reduced the pitch, then the power, and we began an open climb up to 15,000 feet MSL. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

On the inbound leg [to Billings], the aircraft had experienced three APU auto shutdowns. This drove the Captain to start working with Maintenance Control.… During the turn, after completion of the walkaround, I started referencing multiple checklists…to prepare for the non-normal, first deicing of the year. I then started looking at the standard items.… It was during this time that I looked at the BILLINGS 4 Departure, [pages] 10-3 and 10-3-1.… There are no altitudes on…page [10-3], so I referenced [page] 10-3-1. On [page] 10-3-1 for the BILLINGS 4 Departure at the bottom, I saw RWY 10L, so I zoomed in to read this line. When I did the zoom, it cut off the bottom of the page, which is the ROUTING. Here it clearly states, “Maintain 15,000 or assigned lower.” I never saw this line. When we briefed prior to push, the departure was briefed as, “Heading 098, climb to 4,600 feet MSL,” so neither the PF nor the PM saw the number 15,000 feet MSL. The 45 minute turn was busy with multiple non-standard events. The weather was not great. However, that is no excuse for missing the 15,000 foot altitude on the SID.
Turbulent Expansion This ERJ175 pilot attempted to expand the EFB display during light turbulence. Difficulties stemming from the turbulence and marginal EFB location rendered the EFB unusable, so the pilot chose to disregard the EFB entirely.■ We were on short final, perhaps 2,000 feet above field elevation. [It had been a] short and busy flight. I attempted to zoom in to the Jepp Chart currently displayed on my EFB to reference some information. The EFB would not respond to my zooming gestures. After multiple attempts, the device swapped pages to a different chart. I was able to get back to the approach page but could not read it without zooming. I attempted to zoom again, but with the light turbulence, I could not hold my arm steady enough to zoom. [There is] no place to rest your arm to steady your hand because of the poor mounting location on the ERJ175.

After several seconds of getting distracted by…this EFB device, I realized that I was…heads-down for way too long and not paying enough attention to the more important things (e.g., acting as PM). I did not have the information I needed from the EFB. I had inadvertently gotten the EFB onto a company information page, which is bright white rather than the dark nighttime pages, so I turned off my EFB and continued the landing in VMC without the use of my EFB. I asked the PF to go extra slowly clearing the runway to allow me some time to get the taxi chart up after landing.

…I understand that the EFB is new and there are bugs... This goes way beyond the growing pains. The basic usability is unreliable and distracting.… In the cockpit, the device is nearly three feet away from the pilot’s face, mounted almost vertically…at a height level to your knees. All [EFB] gestures in the airplane must be made from the shoulder, not the wrist. Add some turbulence to that, and you have a significant heads-down distraction in the cockpit. Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 459 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States.
Learn more »February 2018 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,651 General Aviation Pilots 1,065 Controllers 440 Flight Attendants 420 Military/Other 298 Dispatchers 231 Mechanics 117 TOTAL 7,222 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2 Airport Facility or Procedure 11 ATC Equipment or Procedure 5 Hazard to Flight 1 Other 1 TOTAL 20 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 459

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

CALLBACK 460 - May 2018

ASRS Callback - Wed, 07/18/2018 - 10:47
Share or Problem viewing / mobile device: CLICK HERE
Issue 460 May 2018 Most aviators will ask themselves that question at some time during their career. Much has been researched, studied, and written about thinking and decision making that occur in the cockpit. Pilots routinely combat many situations and flight hazards while integrating sound judgment, threat analysis, decision making, situational awareness, and a mature CRM process in their bid to operate each flight safely.

The cockpit is a dynamic classroom that offers valuable insight into what and how we think during flight. External stimuli are not well controlled, if at all. The environment is complex. There are no freezes, time outs, or mulligans, and stakes are always high. These facts may both hone and hinder the thinking process. They also accent the serious nature of the incidents archived in the ASRS online database.

Despite superb research, time-tested tools, and effective CRM processes available and used by pilots, ASRS has received reports suggesting that, on occasion, the quality of thinking in the cockpit may deteriorate. This month, CALLBACK shares incidents intended to stimulate discussion regarding cockpit thinking, as well as inputs, factors, and biases that may influence cockpit decisions.A Man and His Mooney A Mooney 201 pilot altered a procedure and expected no adverse consequences. The technique was not thought through carefully or mentioned to the other pilot, and the unmitigated risk produced a less than desirable outcome.■ I was flying chase support for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).… [We] were chasing a UAV capable of very slow flight. In order to stay in position, our airspeed, with full flaps and low power, was staying at the stall speed of the aircraft. As a result, the stall warning horn was frequently and sometimes continuously sounding. It made communication with the ground-based pilots of the UAV and ATC difficult.

I made the decision, without seeking input from the copilot, to pull the circuit breaker to silence the stall warning horn. It seems that, at the same time, I inadvertently also pulled the gear relay circuit [breaker]. This was forbidden by written company policy and sound judgment. The results have seared the reasons for this into my mind.

When our mission was complete, we returned to our home base. Post chase and during our return, I failed to remember to reset the circuit breakers. Because of this, the gear was…unable to be extended. I completed the pre-landing checks, including verbal callouts for the gear. I selected gear down and checked for the green cross-hatching on the floor of the Mooney. I saw, or evidently thought I saw, a safe indicator. In hindsight, I believe I saw what I expected to see. I continued in the pattern and final approach, checking and verbalizing gear down twice more, once on base and once on short final. For these last two checks, I improperly relied on the gear position switch for confirmation. As a result, I made a gear-up landing…without injury.…

The issue of this report is my poor judgment and, to an equal degree, an inadequate pre-landing checklist. I foolishly broke policy and procedure, as well as good flight judgment.
Is the Pilot in Command? An examiner expected this Pilot in Command (PIC) to accomplish a procedure for which the PIC was not trained. The PIC attempted the procedure, but aircraft control suffered and the maneuver became unmanageable.
■ I was flying in the right seat of a King Air 250 for a pilot with whom I fly regularly. He was being evaluated by an FAA inspector in a passenger seat for a part 135.297 Instrument Proficiency Check (IPC). After takeoff, upon reaching 500 feet, heading 140 degrees`…in IMC, and after [we] engaged the autopilot, the inspector stated, “The right engine has failed.” He expected either the pilot or me to simulate an engine failure, despite the fact that neither the pilot nor I had actually been trained to reconfigure the right power and propeller levers to zero thrust. We knew ahead of time that there would be a simulated engine failure, but had never experienced that scenario in the actual aircraft. The pilot pulled the right power lever back thinking that was adequate to simulate engine failure while we simulated the memory items to secure the “failed” engine.

At this point, we realized the right engine was creating enough drag that full left rudder could not overcome the adverse yaw, and the autopilot kicked off. I was communicating with departure and was queried twice about our heading as we continued in a right turn. As the airspeed decayed and the aircraft could not be brought around to our assigned heading, we were told that we could have our engine back, and upon setting normal power, we were able to fly normally and were vectored for an ILS approach. [We] will be meeting with the FAA tomorrow to discuss this incident. I have been informed that the FAA is critical of my cockpit resource management during the flight. What’s It All About? After departure, this CRJ200 crew heard an unfamiliar noise and perceived a minor irregularity. The misunderstood problem and multiple classic threats spawned a domino chain of self-induced complications.
■ [After departure] as we accelerated through 200 knots, we both noticed a loud noise that we could attribute to…airflow over an open panel on the aircraft. [We] agreed it was likely the Headset and Nose Gear Door Switch Panel.… The Captain…called for…the After Takeoff Checklist.… After completing the procedure, I read through the checklist silently and then called, “After Takeoff Checklist Complete.” Around…8,000 feet MSL,… the autopilot disconnected on its own. The Captain reengaged the autopilot, [but] within a minute, it disconnected again.… The Captain chose to hand-fly the aircraft.

Passing through 10,000 feet I [toggled] the “No Smoking” sign switch to signal to our Flight Attendants.… The switch did not chime. I tried the “Fasten Seatbelts” switch, which also did not chime.… It was at this point we began to notice…extremely diminished climb performance, and [we] were not able to accelerate past 260 to 270 knots.… We knew something was wrong, but we could not figure out what. The Captain asked me to begin reviewing all of the system status pages to see if there were any other indications to give us a clue as to why we did not have any climb performance.… We began calculating our fuel burn, and discovered we were burning…about 4,800 pounds per hour. With about 5,000 pounds of fuel and about 40 minutes of flight time remaining, we decided it was best to divert.…

[When the] Captain called for gear down,… I reached for the gear handle and noticed that it was down.… We immediately realized our mistake.… I had never selected the gear up on departure. I am not sure what to attribute this mistake to other than complacency and distractions. On departure, I do recall reaching for the gear handle. I believe I became distracted by reaching for the SPEED mode button and NAV button. We became distracted by the noise generated by the gear.… We further became distracted by an autopilot that wouldn’t stay engaged and having to hand-fly the aircraft.… We became fixated on only one…problem while dealing with other small, seemingly unassociated problems.… The maximum gear extended speed was exceeded by approximately 10 to 20 knots. There was also a flap overspeed on final, and the thrust reversers were not armed for landing (I don’t recall completing the landing checklist).

…It is one thing to miss a flow; it is another to read and verify a checklist and still miss an item—that is what the checklist is for. Additionally, once an issue is discovered in flight, you must also sit back and review even the most basic reasons why a problem is occurring. We failed to notice that our gear was down for the entire hour we were in flight. We were very focused on other possible issues, and failed to sit back and evaluate the big picture. Snowing the Snowbird An A321 Captain was given conflicting reports regarding how effective the deicing procedure had been. The Captain pragmatically declared that it was a success, but he subsequently regretted his declaration and decision. From the Flight Attendant's Report:■ [The] aircraft had remained overnight during an ice-and-freezing-rain storm.… Significant ice remained on all wing surfaces and several cabin windows. I called the Captain to advise him, and he stated that he would notify the deice crew to inspect the aircraft. Additional deice fluid was applied only to the right wing. I called the Captain a second time and advised him that significant ice was still present and that the crew had not successfully removed the contamination. I was told that the deice crews gave the aircraft a “go” and that we were departing. After takeoff, I photographed the left wing and called two Flight Attendants to witness the buildup. One of the Flight Attendants immediately contacted the Captain to express his concerns. Only then did the Captain leave the cockpit to investigate. His reply: “I am so sorry, the deice crews lied to me!” From the First Officer's Report:■ The aircraft was deiced in accordance with our approved procedures, and after deicing, a cabin crewmember brought to the Captain’s attention that there appeared to be some residue, snow, or ice on the right wing. We requested that the aircraft be deiced again, and it was done again in accordance with our procedures. After departure, the Captain responded to a call from the cabin indicating that there was ice on the left wing. He left the cockpit to look for himself, and in fact reported to me that there was a small amount of ice on the outboard area of the left wing. The aircraft performed normally throughout the flight.… A suggestion would be to change deicing procedures to include a cabin check after deicing is complete to verify that the aircraft is clean. Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 460 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States.
Learn more »March 2018 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,854 General Aviation Pilots 1,174 Controllers 516 Flight Attendants 445 Military/Other 338 Mechanics 263 Dispatchers 108 TOTAL 7,698 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 7 Airport Facility or Procedure 4 ATC Equipment or Procedure 7 Company Policy 2 Hazard to Flight 1 TOTAL 21 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 460

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

CALLBACK 461 - June 2018

ASRS Callback - Wed, 07/18/2018 - 10:46
Share or Problem viewing / mobile device: CLICK HERE
Issue 461 June 2018 The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is designed to monitor potential airborne conflicts as they develop between suitably equipped aircraft. With TCAS installed, the system displays proximate traffic for the flight crew. TCAS issues Traffic Advisory (TA) notifications when a conflict becomes credible, and it provides Resolution Advisory (RA) command guidance when a pilot must actively monitor or adjust the aircraft flight path. Current generation TCAS II RAs command vertical escape maneuvers that increase or maintain separation between aircraft when a threat is perceived. TCAS has proven to be effective in reducing collision potential between aircraft, but the system has also caused confusion in the cockpit.

ASRS has received reports of false TCAS indications and invalid RAs that have resulted in reduced separation and safety between aircraft. RA climbs have been reported that either should have been issued as RA descents or should not have been issued at all. Dangerous aircraft flight paths have resulted from ghost target intruders. Near miss incidents without any TCAS warnings have been reported as well.

This month CALLBACK shares reported incidents of illogical TCAS and RA indications and some ensuing problems that were generated as a result. Several lessons may be gleaned. Chief among them is the notion that safety, judgment, and common sense may temper procedural obedience when evaluating and responding to TCAS advisories. Heads Up! A de Havilland Dash-8 crew had the traffic in sight when they received an RA. A dilemma was created when the RA, which directed a climb toward the traffic, contradicted the crew’s solution to the airborne conflict.■ We were told to contact…Approach. We switched over to the new frequency and called multiple times with no response. We noticed traffic on our TCAS moving toward us at 4,500 feet. We were at 4,000 feet. We had the traffic in sight, which was a helicopter. We were still unable to contact Approach. Within seconds the traffic that was called out to us as a “maintain vertical speed” by our TCAS became a “monitor vertical speed.” Traffic was descending into us and was inside the bubble on the TCAS display. It went from 400 feet above to 300 feet to 200 feet. We had him in sight the entire time. We received an RA to “adjust vertical speed” and [a command to] climb 200 to 500 feet per minute (fpm). Immediately the Captain and I agreed that was not at all appropriate as the traffic was slowly descending from above onto and toward us. We pushed the nose over and started a descent and turn away from the oncoming traffic. It was, without a doubt in my mind, the correct maneuver to keep the situation from [deteriorating]. After receiving a “clear of conflict” indication and watching the traffic pass overhead, we returned to our assigned altitude…and heading. Shortly after that, Approach finally responded to our calls, and we reported the incident to them.
RA Go-Around An inopportune RA resulted in a go-around for this A321 crew. The go-around subsequently induced its own issues.
■ We were on final approach…for the ILS, descending normally through about 1,800 feet and slowing from about 180 knots with gear down and flaps just selected to configuration 3. Autopilot 2 and autothrust were engaged, and we were in Approach Mode. I was…flying, and the Captain (CA) was…monitoring. We got a TCAS RA with “climb, climb” and climb indications on the PFD. There had been no traffic alerts and no indications of other traffic in front of us. The weather was VMC. I began a climb to comply with the RA, and a few seconds later we got a “clear of conflict” advisory. I leveled the aircraft at about 2,300 feet and began a slight descent to the missed approach altitude of 2,000 feet that was already set. Simultaneously, I called, “Go around,” while pushing the thrust levers to Takeoff/Go-around (TOGA) and then retarding them to the climb detent. I also called for go-around flaps. The CA raised the gear and began to retract the flaps. However, the thrust remained at full power, and airspeed continued to accelerate rapidly. The CA continued to raise the flaps to up, and I disengaged autothrust and reduced thrust some more. During this time we may have experienced a flap or gear overspeed, although we did not get any advisory messages. Because of the RA and our relatively low altitude, I did not want to pull thrust any closer to idle since I did not feel it was safe. A few moments later we received a second RA as we passed over the departure end of [the] runway. As I responded, it went away, and we continued the missed approach with vectors to an uneventful landing. We reported the missed approach and RAs to…Tower, who replied that they had no traffic in the area. We believe the RAs may have been erroneous.Clear Weather, Clear Choice, and Clear of Traffic An Embraer Captain received an RA shortly after takeoff. Careful evaluation of the threat and a timely decision prevented the problem from escalating.
■ We were taking off [from] Runway 15L at IAH. ATC told us to line up and wait. Once cleared for takeoff, ATC instructed us to fly runway heading and maintain 2,000 feet. I was the Pilot Flying (PF). We took off and leveled…at 2,000 feet as instructed. ATC instructed that there would be traffic crossing overhead at 3,000 feet and to stay level at 2,000 feet. We stayed at 2,000 feet and had the traffic in sight. At this time, the TCAS system sensed the traffic and gave an RA to climb. I disregarded this RA and stayed level at 2,000 feet. We had the traffic in sight the whole time, and we were complying with ATC instructions. I believe if I would have followed the RA, this would have caused a major issue and possibly a midair collision.

My FO, my jump-seater, and I all had the traffic in sight the whole time. Once the traffic was clear,… ATC instructed us to climb unrestricted to 16,000 feet. We proceeded on our way uneventfully.

I believe, in this…situation, that the TCAS was wrong. If I [had] not [had] the traffic in sight, we would have immediately followed the RA, but [since] we did have the traffic and we knew he would be crossing overhead, the best action was to stay level at 2,000 feet and [let] the traffic pass overhead. Close Encounters The first hint of conflict for this B737 pilot was a Controller-issued level-off and a tight turn toward the airport. The threat may have been avoided if the TCAS had issued an alert.■ We were vectored off of the arrival…and told to expect the visual to Runway 22L. The Controller gave us a left turn to 340 degrees and a descent from 4,000 feet to 3,000 feet.

Passing through 3,250 feet and…approaching final, the Controller called out a traffic alert and told us to level off. We leveled at 3,150 feet. He then told us to make a tight left turn toward the airport. He called traffic off our right side, which we were unable to acquire visually. I immediately turned the autopilot off.… [I] was flying mostly by instruments and monitoring bank angle and altitude and was, thus, unable to scan outside for traffic. The Captain was looking outside and unable to see the conflict. I did look down at my MFD and saw a yellow traffic target on the right side of our aircraft symbol at +100 feet.

We were subsequently cleared for the visual approach once the traffic was no longer a factor, and we landed the aircraft normally. Oddly, we did not receive a TCAS RA or TA aural alert. One hundred feet of vertical separation is the closest I have ever been to another aircraft, and I consider this a near miss event.

There were no crew errors made which contributed to this event. We followed all ATC instructions as precisely as possible. I believe this was…a bad vector…which led to a near miss event. It is also possible that…the GA aircraft was…[where] he should not have been. Communicate and Coordinate Miscommunication and a suspicious TCAS indication combined to produce this airborne conflict. The Controller immediately issued new clearances to avoid a collision.■ Aircraft X checked onto my frequency at FL340 requesting FL360. As soon as I was able, I climbed him to FL360. At this point, he was approximately 40 miles from opposite direction traffic, [which was] climbing. I anticipated separation and climbed Aircraft Y to FL350 (I believe he was out of FL310 when this was issued). A few minutes later, I noticed Aircraft X was leveling at FL355.

Concerned now [that Aircraft X] might be traffic with Aircraft Y, I asked Aircraft X to report level at FL360. No response. I attempted again; no response. I then noticed Aircraft X descending (FL354) head-on into Aircraft Y. Two immediate clearances were issued, one to Aircraft X (30 degrees right, no response) and one to Aircraft Y (descend to FL330).

Shortly after the immediate clearances were issued, Aircraft X responded and told us he was trying to [contact] us and was turning left 30 degrees. I can only assume we kept blocking each other out, although I never heard him transmit anything. He went on to tell me that there was a ghost target 400 feet above where he was (FL355). [I observed] no traffic 400 feet above [him]. He leveled off without saying anything and stayed there for several minutes. I queried him on receiving a TCAS RA, and he said that he did not receive one. The [radar return] for Aircraft X was in the vicinity of [only] two others: Aircraft Y, now at FL340, and another carrier at FL390, directly above [Aircraft X and Aircraft Y].

Avoiding a ghost target, in my opinion, was the right move on his part. I wish he would have advised us prior to taking action.… Had the pilot of Aircraft X decided to descend to FL350 or FL345 on his own to avoid the conflict, there very well could have been a midair collision. Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 461 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States.
Learn more »April 2018 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,486 General Aviation Pilots 1,325 Controllers 508 Flight Attendants 514 Military/Other 326 Mechanics 260 Dispatchers 142 TOTAL 8,561 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 7 Airport Facility or Procedure 4 ATC Equipment or Procedure 7 Hazard to Flight 2 Other 3 TOTAL 23 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 461


NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

CALLBACK 462 - July 2018

ASRS Callback - Wed, 07/18/2018 - 10:45
Share or Problem viewing / mobile device: CLICK HERE
Issue 462 July 2018 The National Airspace System (NAS) is complex. The NAS comprises controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other airspace. Types of airspace are dictated by the complexity or density of aircraft movements, nature of the operations conducted within the airspace, the level of safety required, and national and public interest.1 Each type of airspace has its own rules and regulations that govern aircraft operations. The NAS must accommodate a multitude of different and changing operational needs. It is continually being modified, and accordingly, high levels of proficiency and adaptability are required from both pilots and controllers.

Any unauthorized entry into NAS airspace is a Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) violation and may result in an airborne conflict, reduced separation, or a decrease in flight safety. Unauthorized entries occur for many reasons. Procedural errors, airborne conflicts, misconceptions regarding airspace or specific operating requirements, and disregard for FARs have all been identified in reports submitted to ASRS.

This month CALLBACK shares reported incidents of airspace violations along with some of the reporters’ reactions, concerns, and insight. From One Threat to Another A BE200 pilot observed an intruder on the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The airborne conflict and subsequent evasive action resulted in an unannounced incursion into Class B airspace without prior clearance.■ After a VFR departure, the Tower approved a right turn on course for departure eastbound. Shortly after departing the Class D airspace during level cruise flight at 4,500 feet MSL, I saw a TCAS target appear about four miles ahead and around 500 feet below my altitude. I continued to scan outside trying to visually acquire the traffic as well as update their position on the TCAS. As I approached the target, it began to indicate a climb on the TCAS. I was unable to acquire it visually and unable to determine a direction of travel. At a distance estimated at less than one-half mile on the TCAS screen, I took evasive action in the form of a climb to avoid a potential collision. There was no other traffic displayed above us in the area. During the evasive action, I inadvertently penetrated the overlying Class B airspace starting at 5,000 feet MSL by an estimated 300 feet for about 30 seconds. After passing the TCAS target, I descended back down below the Class B airspace. I was not in contact with Approach during or after the…incident.
Ins and Outs of Class B Airspace This air carrier Captain was vectored out of and back into Class B airspace. The incident triggered questions, concerns, and misconceptions regarding Class B requirements.
■ We were coming into New Orleans on the RYTHM arrival, which ties directly to the RNAV [approach to] Runway 20. Somewhere around OYSTY, Approach cleared us to 2,000 feet, slowed us to 210 [knots], and cleared us for the approach. We were in IMC. We descended to be outside JASPO (the FAF) at 2,000 feet. This resulted in…getting down to 2,000 feet prior to 15 NM from New Orleans (outside the Class B), doing about 210 knots. When we got to RAYOP, Approach said, “You are reentering the Class B.” Oh. Whoops. Class B excursion.

This whole Class B thing has become such an issue that I don’t even know what is right anymore. Clearly we were speeding below the lateral limits. However, I was under the impression that the Class B excursions have been occurring during visual approaches, where the pilots are operating on their own recognizance and descending too soon. In this case, we were under ATC control, on an instrument approach, and in IMC. The Controller gave us a clearance below the floor of the Class B, and at a high speed.… We were at an ATC assigned speed too high for that position. Are we really supposed to be trapping this type of ATC error…without the tools to do so?… I just don’t understand what’s going on.… [ATC] did not warn us that we might go out the bottom and…didn’t tell us when we did. Do Not Enter An air carrier Captain did not recognize a procedural error that occurred prior to departure. That error led to a late turn immediately after takeoff and resulted in the aircraft entering a prohibited area.
■ I was Pilot-in-Command.… After all pre-departure checklists were completed, we taxied to…Runway 1 for takeoff. I glanced over at the First Officer’s (FO’s) side to see if everything was set up.… Everything looked normal.… We made a normal takeoff, broke ground, and did the normal post-rotation clean-up of the aircraft. When we reached the fix on the departure…[where we should have] turned…up the river, I knew something was wrong. I grabbed the yoke and made an immediate left turn…back on course. When I looked at the FO’s [Primary Flight Displays (PFDs)],… they were configured incorrectly for the takeoff, so I…corrected his displays. After [that], I engaged LNAV and VNAV to their normal takeoff configuration…[and] selected the autopilot on.… I glanced out my left window and saw [that]…I was still over the river. Shortly afterward, we were handed off from Tower to Departure.… At some point, we were queried if we had a minute to talk.… The Controller then informed us that we had a “possible traffic deviation.” I started thinking about it and did not think I had done anything wrong. When I landed,…I was informed that we had penetrated the P-56A airspace that protects the White House.

The event occurred because one pilot was not in [the proper] FMS [mode].… When the airplane wanted to turn, it was not [directing the FO] to do that. I will now double check the screens and navigation tools that are supposed to be on…for takeoff. It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, Or Is It? A private pilot sighted what was thought to be a large bird in controlled airspace. The pilot’s confusion changed to surprise when the species was identified.■ [I] departed Grand Prairie Municipal Airport at 2,500 feet with a southerly heading until I was clear of Cedar Hill (all the big towers). Once clear, I started to turn left to overfly Mid-Way Regional Airport [JWY] and climb to 3,000 feet. [Beyond the] Class B [airspace], I started my climb to 7,500 feet toward the Little Rock area. I was using Terrell Municipal Airport as a fix and a check for weather and altimeter [setting] when I noticed something that looked like a bird.… I see a lot of birds of different types, and I thought I was seeing a bird at first. I thought, “Good, I’m higher and the bird should not be a factor.” Then I tried to refocus my eyes as the movement wasn’t quite like a bird; it was close, but not the same. Worse, my brain was not making sense of what kind of bird this might be as I was trying to “see” a black vulture.… My eyes kept telling me that this black vulture had four evenly spaced red dots (as a square) on its back.

Then I got mad – that’s a drone. And since I don’t know a lot about them, I have no way to process how close the drone was. My best guess is within 500 feet.

My position was…southwest of Terrell Municipal Airport at 7,500 feet. Aviate, Navigate, and Communicate An airspace violation, aggravated by communication errors, resulted in multiple airborne conflicts, confusion, and angst for all before the situation was resolved.From the Tower Controller’s Report:■ While working Local Control North, landing Runway 9L on East Flow, I encountered a situation where Aircraft X was catching up to Aircraft Y, which had been previously cleared to land. The separation between those two aircraft decreased to about two miles, and I still was not talking to Aircraft X. While focused on that, a different aircraft, Aircraft Z called my frequency on about a seven or eight mile final, which would put them close to [another airport]. I advised Aircraft Z to continue, not realizing that he was about to inquire about the VFR target below them and about a mile in front of them. When they pointed out the target to me, I exchanged a brief traffic call but Aircraft Z was already responding to a Resolution Advisory (RA). I asked them to advise when they could continue the approach. The VFR target Mode C displayed…2,300 feet while Aircraft Z was level at 3,000 feet. Aircraft Z said that their TCAS showed the VFR target only 300 feet below them and climbing. As this all was happening, I still had yet to rectify the two aircraft that were inside the Final Approach Fix (FAF) with reduced separation. Everyone continued and landed without incident.

I was not talking to Aircraft X, which was getting too close to Aircraft Y, so my focus was on working from the airport out on my final [approach].… Aircraft Z was on my frequency, [but was] outside of my airspace without all conflicts being resolved in [the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)] airspace. From the Approach Controller’s Report:■ Aircraft Z was inbound…from the northwest. Aircraft Z was cleared for the Visual Approach to Runway 9L. A VFR aircraft departed [another airport] and was in a climbing left turn to 2,300 feet and headed west. [The other airport] is eight miles west of Aircraft Z’s destination. The base of the Class B airspace is 1,900 feet, so the VFR [aircraft] was a Class B violator. The VFR [aircraft] passed within 700 feet vertically and 0.48 NM laterally from Aircraft Z. No traffic was issued. Aircraft Z switched to…Tower before they were supposed to and advised Tower of the TCAS alert. I should be more aware of VFR traffic in the vicinity of [the other airport]. 1. https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals
    /aviation/phak/media/17_phak_ch15.pdf Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 462 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States.
Learn more »May 2018 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,065 General Aviation Pilots 1,292 Controllers 583 Flight Attendants 454 Military/Other 320 Mechanics 263 Dispatchers 191 TOTAL 8,168 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 9 Airport Facility or Procedure 4 ATC Equipment or Procedure 5 Hazard to Flight 1 TOTAL 19 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 462

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance Quarterly March 2018

AskBob News - Mon, 06/25/2018 - 10:57

The March 2018 issue of Avation MX Human Factors Quarterly is now available at https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/fatigue/publications/media/
Aviation-Mx-HF-Newsletter-March-2018.pdf

In this issue 

* Meet the Authors
*  Just Culture Stories: What can go right and what can go wrong
*  “It Doesn’t Happen Overnight!” - Improving Safety Culture in the Workplace
*  Beyond “Swiss Cheese” – How organizational choices make the holes bigger and accidents more likely
*  Data mining in Maintenance Human Factors using wearable devices and text mining
*  We Want You!
*  Upcoming Events

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: News, US

AD 2016-19-13 Dassault - Applicability issue for Falcon 2000

AskBob News - Fri, 06/15/2018 - 12:55

By looking at both AD versions below you will see a difference. The Federal Register version is correct which includes the Falcon 2000 in the "Applicability" section of the AD. The version you find on the FAA main website faa.gov which is typically used includes the 2000EX but excludes Falcon 2000.  

Maintenance controllers will use various methods for checking for possible new ADs, typically not the Federal Register that I know of. The AD biweekly listing includes the 2000EX, but excludes the 2000. Also, if you search by Make/Model it will come up for 2000EX, not the 2000. This AD can easily be missed. AD must be settled "Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD".   The effective date is 11/22/16, so it is getting close. 

The AD does include the Falcon 2000 in the preamble & modification sections so it does help send up a flag about it if the Federal Register isin't checked. If relying on the indexes or applicability section then it easily can be missed.

I contacted the FAA per the AD and received an email directing me to use the Federal Register version for compliance. I notified my FAA PMI of my handling.

 

I'm sharing this to hopefully prevent non-compliance.

 

FAA AD  http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/74d74d0c76a67ed786258050005838da/$FILE/2016-19-13.pdf

 

Federal Register version https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-10-18/pdf/2016-22832.pdf

  T. Nolte
Chief Inspector

field_vote: 5Your rating: None Average: 5 (1 vote)
Categories: News, US

Aviation Ground Support Equipment: A Brief History

AskBob News - Thu, 06/14/2018 - 11:12

Here at GSE Solutions, we are fascinated by the Aviation industries’ rich and intriguing past which stretches back to the early 18th century. A series of technological breakthroughs has since helped shape the way people manoeuvre aircraft and ground support equipment today. Here is a detailed guide of prominent dates throughout the last 300-years which highlights important historical events.

The earliest development of ground support equipment dates back to 1705. This was the year in which the Goldhofer family started a forge in Armendigan, Germany. The forge evolved over time and created the very first innovation centre for designing and creating brand new mechanical concepts.

In 1923, Forklift manufacturer Clark Material Handling built the Duat Tow Tractor. This design was tasked with pulling freight, lumber and industrial material. The model is widely considered to be the inspiration for many of the designs we see operating in the present day.

World War II had an incredibly significant impact on the Aviation industry. At the beginning of the conflict in 1939, the US Army had just under 4,000 aircrafts within their fleet, whereas the latter stages saw them reach almost 400,000. The biggest impact on production came in 1944, when 100,000 aircrafts were manufactured.

This created the very first marketing opportunity for ground support equipment and provided a chance for well-known manufacturers to get their ideas and concepts into circulation.

Some of the big names to establish themselves during this period were Stewart & Stevenson, who constructed hundreds of tractors and ordnance loaders for the US army, and the Northwestern Motor Company, who introduced their very first tow tractor design.

The Hobart Brothers were another company who oversaw a heavy production line throughout these years, culminating in a vast number of generators and welders being built to support the war efforts by Allied forces.

This particular organization would then play a huge part in the first few years after the conclusion of the war. This was when commercial Aviation started to take a stronghold around the world, which meant specialized equipment needed to be manufactured to keep up with demands.

The Hobart Brothers decided the set up Hobart Ground Power, to help American Airlines design generators that were powerful enough to start up large scale aircraft.

Garsite LLC also designed and distributed a wide range of specialist Aviation equipment. They manufactured: hydrant dispensers, fuel delivery trucks, above-ground fuel storage tanks, Aviation storage systems and vacuum pumper trucks.

Other notable events that took place within the early stages of peace time were Stewart & Stevenson entering the GSE business alongside GM Detroit Petrol, British company Textron GSE being founded and Tracma starting their line of tractors which were specifically designed for towing aircraft.

In 1960, engineers working at FMC Corporation started to design and construct some of the very first deicer vehicles. Some of the earliest models were able to fully deice aeroplanes in just 10-minutes.

The company also helped to develop a brand new cargo handling system for the new generation of aircraft. Their concept, known as the Flite-Line Loader, allowed people to unload the entirety of a plane’s cargo with ease.

This was also the year in which Unitron started to supply the defense-aerospace, aviation and industrial markets with GPU’s, PCA’s and other power systems.

In 1969, Eagle tugs introduced the world to the Cargo Bobtail Tow Tractor. This design is still the premier towing tractor used today, being sold across the world at multiple Aviation marketplaces. These robust and low-profile models have encapsulated the long-term aims set out by visionaries in the very early stages of the aviation industry.

This article was written by Aviation enthusiast David Newman. David is the Director of Aviation marketing agency Ad Lab and works on behalf of Aviation specialists, GSE Solutions. 

field_vote: 0No votes yet
Categories: News, US