FAAST Blast: Week of Nov 13, 2017 Proposed ADs for Piper/Textron Aviation

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 11/17/2017 - 13:35

Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

Proposed ADs for Piper/Textron Aviation

The FAA last week issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that addresses reports of main wing spar corrosion found in certain Piper PA-28 and PA-32 Cherokee series airplanes. This proposed AD would require installing an inspection access panel in the lower wing skin near the left and the right main wing spars if not already there, inspecting the left and the right main wing spars for corrosion, and taking all necessary corrective actions. The FAA estimates the AD would affect 11,476 airplanes of U.S. Registry. For more details and for instructions on how to submit comments before the December 22 deadline, go to

            The FAA also revised an NPRM originally designed for Textron Aviation A36TC and B36TC Bonanza models to include all Textron Aviation Models S35, V35, V35A, and V35B airplanes that have the optional turbocharger engine installed. The proposed AD aims to prevent

failure of the exhaust tailpipe v-band coupling (clamp) that may lead to detachment of the exhaust tailpipe from the turbocharger and allow high-temperature exhaust gases to enter the engine compartment. The comment period for the NPRM has been reopened until December 26, 2017. For more, go to


Aeronautical Chart Users Guide Revamped

Last month, the FAA’s Aeronautical Information Services (formerly, “AeroNav Products”) released a revamped Chart Users Guide (CUG). The CUG website offers improved navigation, updated information and expanded content, ranging from a more robust IFR Enroute & Terminal Terms section, to the addition of a “References & Abbreviations” and “What’s New” sections. The CUG is an unparalleled training and study aid for student pilots, Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operators, flight instructors, and anyone wanting to familiarize themselves with FAA charts and publications. It serves as a reference for both novice and experienced pilots alike, decoding the legends and information found on VFR charts, Helicopter Route charts, Flyway Planning charts, Terminal Procedure Publications and IFR Enroute charts. 

Download the new CUG at:

Runway Length Matters

            See the NTSB’s Safety Alert (SA-071) on Understanding the Potential Hazards on Intersection Takeoffs at


Chart A Course for “Sim City”

Explore the exciting world of flight simulation technology and its evolving impact on aviation safety in our new issue of FAA Safety Briefing. Download your copy or read online at: For a good primer on how flight simulators have evolved, check out author William Dubois’ article, “Link Trainer, to Desktop, to Redbird.” You can view a mobile-friendly version of this article at


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Engine Maintenance and Performance Monitoring

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 11/16/2017 - 08:06

Did you know that most general aviation fatal accidents are caused by in-flight loss of control? Many of these loss of control accidents are due to engine failure-related factors. Between 2001-2010, 35 of 70 randomly selected accidents had engine maintenance errors identified as a contributing factor. Proper engine maintenance, post maintenance, advanced pre-flight, and performance monitoring can go a long way to eliminating this type of mishap.

FAA Sound Maintenance Practices PDF

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Flight Standards Service Terminology

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 11/03/2017 - 11:09

Hi, folks -

We’ve received quite a few questions about the nomenclature everyone should be using to talk about our new structure. I addressed some of these issues in the October Monthly Message, but below is an expanded guide to Flight Standards Service terminology.

Thanks for the great work -

John Duncan


Proposed Summary of Intent:

Words are the tools we use to think, and how we think drives how we act. Using the right nomenclature for our new functional structure and its constituent parts reinforces and supports the critical cultural changes we continue to make in order to function as an interdependent team.

Flight Standards Service

  • The nomenclature for the overarching organization is “Flight Standards Service.”
    • The acceptable short forms are “Flight Standards” or “the Service.”
    • The acceptable abbreviation is “FS.”


Flight Standards Functional Offices

  • Use the name of the functional office(s) in policy, correspondence, training, and any other formal documents, as well as in verbal communication.
    • Acceptable short forms include Standards, General Aviation, Air Carrier, and Business.
    • Acceptable abbreviations include SS, GA, AC, and FB.


Constituent Organizations (e.g., Divisions, Frontline Offices)

  • Use the name of the division(s) and/or office(s) in policy, correspondence, training, and any other formal documents, as well as in verbal communication.
  • Frontline offices (e.g., Flight Standards District Offices, Certificate Management Offices, Aircraft Evaluation Groups, and International Field Offices) retain their legacy names.
    • Legacy abbreviations (e.g., “FSDO,” CMO,” “AEG,” “IFO”) are acceptable.
  • Aircraft Evaluation Groups have been renamed based on their area of specialty. Short forms are:
    • Small Aircraft AEG
    • Propulsion and APU AEG
    • Transport Aircraft Seattle AEG
    • Transport Aircraft Long Beach AEG
    • Rotorcraft & Powered Lift AEG


Universal Norms for Nomenclature

  • Use the actual name of the organization in policy, correspondence, training, and any other formal documents, as well as in verbal communication.
    • As necessary, use "the appropriate Flight Standards Office." This practice is not intended to create generic offices; rather, it is to prevent having to make another rule change if we were to develop another kind of office.  
  • Limit use of organizational routing codes to coordination grids. Internal routing codes should never be used in written or verbal external communications, including e-mail.
  • Location-reference terms such as “headquarters,” “field,” and “remotely sited inspector” are inaccurate. As appropriate, use “standards” or, for the Air Carrier and/or GA functional offices, “safety assurance.” Regardless of physical proximity to their assigned units, all inspectors are “Aviation Safety Inspectors” or ASIs.







Flight Standards Service

Flight Standards Service

Short Form


Flight Standards

The Service







New (Functional Offices)



Safety Standards

Air Carrier Safety Assurance

General Aviation Safety Assurance

Foundational Business

Short Form


Standards, Air Carrier, General Aviation, Business








New (Functional Offices)


e.g., AFS-200

Air Transportation

Short Form

e.g., AFS-200



e.g., AFS-200






New (Functional Offices)


Flight Standards District Office


Certificate Management Office


Aircraft Evaluation Group


International Field Office

No change

Short Form


No change



No change




New (Functional Offices)



Policy Divisions

Safety Standards


Safety Assurance

(AC and/or GA)

Remotely-Sited Inspector (RSI)

Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI)

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA National Policy - Clarification of Inspection and Overhaul Requirements Under Part 91

AskBob News - Tue, 10/24/2017 - 12:50

Hello Avmgr and Maint subscribers,


The purpose of this email is to ascertain what your interpretations as aviation department managers and maintenance personnel are concerning the FAA’s National Policy Notice N 8900.410 Effective Date: 3/31/17, regarding SUBJ:

Clarification of Inspection and Overhaul Requirements Under Part 91, which will be incorporated into FAA Order 8900.1 before this notice expires 3/31/18.


Please refer to the following link: for the complete text.



Paragraph 4. Background. There have been several recent issues surrounding the interpretation of whether compliance with the manufacturer’s recommended time between overhaul (TBO) intervals are required under Part 91.


Paragraph 5. Discussion. a.(1)(b)  Overhauls are Maintenance. By definition, overhauls are a form of maintenance, not inspection, and are not included in an inspection program. Overhauls are part of the maintenance program. Part 91 operators are not required to comply with a manufacturer’s entire maintenance program; as such, overhauls are not mandatory for part 91 operators.


As a purely Part 91 operator with an aircraft whose engines have exceeded the manufacturer’s recommended calendar TBO interval; however, may still have hundreds or potentially thousands of operating hours remaining until the manufacturer’s recommended hourly TBO interval is reached, does the statement above “…Part 91 operators are not required to comply with a manufacturer’s entire maintenance program; as such, overhauls are not mandatory for part 91 operators.” from your perspective give credence that a Part 91 operator may continue to operate the aircraft and its engines practically and legally?


This interpretation by a Part 91 operator has the potential to save that operator hundreds of thousands to well over one million dollars in engine overhaul costs, or be able to have that operator defer those overhaul costs to a future time.


If a Part 91 operator using the above interpretation uses its own internal maintenance personnel, and the decision is made by that owner to continue to operate its aircraft’s engines per the above FAA National Policy beyond the manufacturer’s recommended TBO interval, then this is straightforward; however, if that same Part 91 operator has its aircraft maintenance performed by a Part 145 repair station, could that operator be at risk by having that repair station contradict the position of the Part 91 operator, mandating overhauls are due citing only the manufacturer’s recommended engine TBO interval, and potentially not issue return to service logbook entry sign offs.


I’ve spoken with several sources including aircraft manufacturers, engine manufacturers, Part 145 repair stations, Part 91 operators and FAA FSDO personnel, and have received a broad spectrum of interpretations on this topic.  I’d be interested in learning your perspective on this issue, especially from Part 91 operators and Part 145 repair stations.


Thank you,


Verlyn Wolfe

Wolfe Aviation

(209) 983-0117 ext. 233 = Office

(209) 607-9804 = Cellular

Categories: News, US

Airtext brings cell phone convenience and other data collection to GA

AskBob News - Thu, 10/19/2017 - 10:22

FLYING Magazine
There are people who claim their cell phone works everywhere, even while cruising along at 10,000 feet in their Baron, or PC-12. Experts will tell you of course that while there's always the chance an airborne phone might grab a scrap or two of cell service in flight, it's never reliable enough to regularly send a text or complete a voice conversation.  READ MORE 

Categories: News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of Oct 16, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Wed, 10/18/2017 - 15:38

FAA Safety Team | Safer Skies Through Education

FAAST Blast – SAIBs Address Helicopter Safety, Pilot and Flight/Ground Instructor AC Revised, Flight Instructor Renewal Methods
Notice Number: NOTC7438

FAAST Blast — Week of Oct 16, 2017 – Oct 22, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

New SAIBs Address Helicopter Safety Issues

On October 13, the FAA issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) SW-17-31 that urges operators to be aware of the crash resistant fuel system (CRFS) capabilities of helicopters they operate. Operating a CRFS compliant helicopter may reduce the risk of post-crash fires and improve occupant survivability in an accident. CRFS standards help accomplish this by minimizing crash-induced fuel leaks and their contact with potential fuel ignition sources both during and after the crash, and increasing the time occupants have available to egress before a post-crash fire could become critical. To read the SAIB, go to

The FAA issued an additional SAIB for helicopter operators and maintenance technicians that addresses a concern with the use of engine inlet barrier filters. SAIB SW-17-30 was prompted by reports of helicopters with inlet barrier filters experiencing abnormal engine operation when exposed to persistent or high precipitation rates.

For more details and recommended actions that can help prevent engine issues when using inlet barriers, go to


AC for Pilot and Flight/Ground Instructors Updated

Advisory Circular (AC) 61-65G, Certification: Pilots and Flight and Ground Instructors, provides guidance for pilot applicants, pilots, flight instructors, ground instructors, and evaluators on the certification standards, knowledge test procedures, and other requirements in 14 CFR part 61.

A recent revision to the AC provides guidance for those persons seeking to conduct enhanced flight vision system (EFVS) operations as well as guidance for airmen seeking an endorsement for helicopter touchdown autorotations. Download AC 61-65G at


How Do You Renew?

Flight instructors: What’s your renewal method of choice? Unlike a private pilot certificate, a flight instructor certificate is valid for only 24 calendar months after an initial certification ride or renewal. For a refresher on the several different ways you can renew your certification, check out the article, “Renewing Your Lease: Options for Flight Instructor Certification Renewal” in the Sep/Oct 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing at To read this article on a mobile device, go to


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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

CALLBACK 453 - October 2017

ASRS Callback - Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:28
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Issue 453 October 2017 The application of team management concepts in the flight deck environment was initially known as cockpit resource management. As techniques and training evolved to include Flight Attendants, maintenance personnel, and others, the new phrase “Crew Resource Management” (CRM) was adopted. CRM, simply put, is “the ability for the crew…to manage all available resources effectively to ensure that the outcome of the flight is successful.”1 Those resources are numerous. Their management involves employing and honing those processes that consistently produce the best possible decisions. Advisory Circular 120-51E, CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING, suggests that CRM training focus on “situation awareness, communication skills, teamwork, task allocation, and decisionmaking within a comprehensive framework of standard operating procedures (SOP).”2

Aircrews frequently experience circumstances that require expert CRM skills to manage situations and ensure their successful outcomes. Effective CRM has proved to be a valuable tool to mitigate risk and should be practiced on every flight. This month CALLBACK shares ASRS reported incidents that exemplify both effective CRM and CRM that appears to be absent or ineffective. Who Has the Aircraft? A B737 Captain had briefed and instituted his non-standard method to transfer aircraft control when the FO performed takeoffs. When he did not employ his own technique, confusion was evident and aircraft control was questionable.■ [As we were] pushing back in Albuquerque, ATC switched the airport around from Runway 26 to Runway 8. The Captain and I ran the appropriate checklist and proceeded to taxi…. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) [for this leg]. The Captain stated previously that he likes to spool the engines up and transfer controls while the aircraft is moving.

Once cleared for takeoff, the Captain spooled the [engines]. I was expecting him to transfer controls. I monitored him spool them up to takeoff power. While he was accelerating, my comment was, “I’m not flying the aircraft. You have the controls.” He seemed confused briefly, and we took off with the Captain in full control without incident. The Captain needs to [abandon] the habit of transferring thrust levers to the First Officer while moving. It’s a bad habit. It can be confusing if one of the crew members is saturated.… Under no circumstance should transfer of thrust levers and aircraft happen while saturated in the takeoff phase while moving. Freedom of Speech This Captain received uncommon, simultaneous inputs from two unexpected sources. An accident may have been averted when the Heavy Transport crew exercised simple, effective CRM in a critical situation and high workload environment.
■ This was a night takeoff,…and it was the FO’s first flying leg of Initial Operating Experience (IOE). Two Relief Pilots were assigned for the flight. We were cleared onto the runway…after a B737 [had landed]. The FO taxied onto the runway for takeoff. Once aligned for takeoff, I took control of the throttles. At this point I thought we were cleared for takeoff, but apparently we were not. I advanced the power to 70% and pressed TOGA. At about that same time, a Relief Pilot alerted the flying pilots that the other plane that had just landed was cleared to [back-taxi]…on the runway, and the Tower alerted us to hold our position. I disconnected the autothrottles and immediately brought them to idle. [Our speed was] approximately 30 knots, and we had used up approximately 200 to 400 feet of runway. The back-taxiing B737 exited the runway.

Looking back, somehow the clearance to take off or the non-clearance was lost in the translation. The Controllers in ZZZZ most often use non-standard phraseology with an accent not easily understood.… Higher than normal workloads [existed] due to a new hire first leg, and the flight was late and had been delayed from the previous day. I had assumed situational awareness with the airport and runway environment. Generally in past practice, ZZZZ holds the landing traffic in the holding bay after landing and does not have two airplanes on the runway at the same time. What “saved” the situation was good CRM and situational awareness by the Relief Pilots.
Finishing Strong This MD80 crew finished the last leg of their trip, but distractions degraded the performance of their duties. Unmanaged threats had contributed to the misperception that the job was done when it was clearly incomplete.From the Captain's report:
■ The landing was uneventful, and we were given an expedited crossing of the departure runway. We accomplished the after landing checklist, but due to the expedited crossing, I wasn’t sure if the First Officer started the APU (which had been consistent/standard practice so far in the trip). We were cleared to enter the ramp, and I consciously elected to leave both engines running (which was contrary to my standard practice during the trip). As we turned to pull into the gate,…an unmarked van cut across our path. We saw him coming, so no immediate stop was necessary.… At the gate,…we pulled to a stop normally, parked the brakes, and I believe I commanded, “Shut down engines.” The FO believes he heard, “Shut down the left engine” (which had been the standard command throughout the trip). He shut down the left engine. The right engine continued to run and we finished the Parking Checklist and departed the cockpit.

Minutes later…I received a page…requesting that I return to the gate. I returned to find the right engine running. I immediately shut off the fuel lever. No damage or injuries occurred. The aircraft was chocked and the brakes parked. In my estimation, there are three distinct contributing factors in this event. 1. Complacency when reading the checklist. I assumed items had been accomplished and felt no need to follow up the response with a tactile and visual check. 2. Complacency when relying on past actions as a predictor of future actions. We had done things the same way each leg, therefore we would continue to do them the same way on every leg. 3. Distractions. The expedited crossing to the ramp side of the runway, compressed time frame for completing the after landing checklists, and vehicular traffic all led to this event.… These issues…still keep happening. Strict, unyielding adherence to policy and procedures is a must. No one is perfect, and that is why policies and procedures exist. An event like this WILL happen if you allow yourself to become too comfortable.
From the First Officer's report:
■ We arrived at the gate, and the parking brake was parked. The Captain remarked, “Shut down the Number 1 Engine, Parking Checklist.” I read the checklist as the Captain responded. At the end of the checklist, I exited the aircraft.… I had walked about 10 gates down from the aircraft…when I heard an announcement asking the flight crew inbound from our flight to please return to the gate.… No one was there when I returned.… About 5 minutes later the agent walked up…and told me that one of the engines had been left running. She let me on the jet bridge and the Captain was walking off the aircraft.…

I believe this problem came about because of a pattern we developed during all our flights.… I started the APU…after landing, and…about two to three minutes [later], would shut down the Number 2 Engine at the Captain’s request. We did this every flight. After landing on this flight, it got very busy.… When…at the gate, the Captain called for me to shut down the Number 1 Engine, I didn’t think about the Number 2 Engine still running.… I read the checklist and listened to the Captain’s responses. I should have been double checking him, but I didn’t.… This has never happened to me.…I’m just grateful that no one was hurt…. Here, Here! and Hear, Hear!This Dash 8 crew experienced a flight control problem that required extensive coordination. Thorough, effective CRM contributed to the orderly sequencing of their decisions and to the successful completion of their flight.
■ We had to deice prior to takeoff, and we checked all flight control movements twice before we took off. At the beginning of the cruise portion of the flight, the…Master Caution Annunciators…and two amber Caution [lights] illuminated: ROLL SPLR INBD HYD (Spoiler Inboard Hydraulics) and ROLL SPLR OUTBD HYD (Spoiler Outboard Hydraulics). We completed the associated Spoiler Failure Checklist, including confirming that all spoilers [indicated] retracted at the PFCS (Primary Flight Control System) indicator. The Pilot Flying, the Captain, continued to hand fly the aircraft (as our autopilot was [inoperative] for all legs). We evaluated all facts, discussed all of our options, and [advised Center of our flight control situation]. We informed them that we were not requiring any assistance (upon landing or elsewhere).

The Captain talked to Dispatch and Maintenance, while I hand flew the aircraft. The Captain, Dispatch, and I all agreed that ZZZ, with its long runways, was the best place to land. I informed our Flight Attendant that we were planning on a normal, uneventful landing with no delays. ATC issued [our runway], and we executed a visual approach. [We accomplished] a normal landing and taxi. We thanked ATC for all of their help. At the gate, the maintenance write up was completed. The smooth outcome can be attributed to very good CRM exhibited today.
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 453 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » August 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,349 General Aviation Pilots 1,391 Controllers 598 Flight Attendants 516 Military/Other 321 Mechanics 203 Dispatchers 196 TOTAL 8,574 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2 ATC Equipment or Procedure 1 TOTAL 3
NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 453
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Categories: News

CALLBACK 452 - September 2017

ASRS Callback - Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:28
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Issue 452 September 2017 This month, CALLBACK again offers the reader a chance to “interact” with the information given in a selection of ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story,” you will find report excerpts describing an event up to a point where a decision must be made or some direction must be given. You may then exercise your own judgment to make a decision or determine a possible course of action that would best resolve the situation.

The selected ASRS reports may not give all the information you want, and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to refine your aviation decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story…” you will find the actions that were taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action. Our intent is to stimulate thought, training, and discussion related to the type of incidents that were reported. The First Half of the StoryWhat’s All the Flap?  B737 First Officer’s Report■ As the Pilot Flying while maneuvering in the busy terminal area, I didn’t notice that the flap indicator did not match the [flap] handle (2 indicated, 30 selected) until the Captain identified it with the…Before Landing Checklist. We checked the Leading Edge Device [LED] indicator on the overhead panel; the LED’s [indicated] FULL EXTEND. We discussed how the aircraft felt as it was being hand flown. The feel was normal.… The airspeed indicator was normal. The aircraft flew normally in all aspects except for the flap indication. All this occurred approaching the final approach fix.. What Would You Have Done?
Takeoff Face-Off  C182 Pilot’s Report ■ [The] airport (with a single runway) was undergoing major construction and had no parallel taxiway.… The only exit from the runway was a single narrow taxiway at the [approach] end of Runway 02 leading between some hangars to and from the FBO. [There was] no operating Control Tower, only UNICOM. Before departure I asked…the FBO what the active runway was, and the reply was, “People are taking off on Runway 02 and landing on Runway 20 to avoid a back taxi on a long runway.” Taxiing out to Runway 02 for departure I encountered another…single engine airplane near the runway end taxiing in on a narrow taxiway…, so we talked ourselves past each other on UNICOM. I had apparently not heard the radio call…of a small jet landing on Runway 20, so I started my takeoff roll on Runway 02.… The aircraft that had [just] landed…was at taxi speed. During my takeoff roll, I only saw that aircraft when I was near rotation speed.
What Would You Have Done?
The Weak Side  B767 Captain’s Report ■ While on climb out, [we] noticed the aircraft was having difficulty climbing through 30,000 feet. We checked the engine instruments and noticed that the right engine fuel flow was indicating 700 pounds per hour. We checked the other engine indications and noticed that they were significantly below the left engine indications.
What Would You Have Done?
Keep the M in MDA  CRJ Captain’s Report ■ We were flying the localizer approach to [Runway] 24L. As we started down to the MDA, we broke out and I started looking for the airport. I was making the callouts to MDA and thought the First Officer was stopping the descent at the MDA. I looked out and back;… he was still descending.…
What Would You Have Done?
An Approach to Remember  B737 Captain’s Report ■ The First Officer (FO) was flying his first arrival to Corpus Christi, and I believe the last time I was there was more than a decade ago, so needless to say, we were not familiar with the Corpus Christi environment. We had been kept high on the arrival by ATC and were hurrying to descend to be stabilized for the approach. We realized that we would be too high for the approach.…
What Would You Have Done?The Rest of the Story
What’s All the Flap?  B737 First Officer’s Report The Reporter's Action■ The Captain elected to continue to land. We used flaps 15 Vref [speed for the approach] and added 10 knots. Landing was uneventful. The flap indicator moved to match the [flap] handle shortly after clearing the runway during taxi. We notified maintenance on gate arrival.
First Half of "Takeoff Face-Off"
Takeoff Face-Off  C182 Pilot’s Report The Reporter's Action■ I thought the best option was to immediately lift off with a slight turn to the right to laterally clear the runway in any case, and that worked. I missed him vertically by 50 feet and laterally by more than 150 feet. Was that the best split-second decision? I thought so - I am an [experienced] pilot. In my opinion, the airport management had made some bad decisions concerning their improvement construction (reconstructing the parallel taxiway), and the airport was dangerous considering their heavy corporate jet traffic. I had not heard the small jet on UNICOM - possibly due to my conversation on UNICOM with the…plane taxiing in (opposite direction) just prior to takeoff. The wind was…light, and Runway 20 was apparently chosen by the jet traffic to, likewise, avoid a back taxi since the only runway exit was at the [departure] end of Runway 20.
First Half of "The Weak Side"
The Weak Side  B767 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ I [requested] to level off at FL350, then to descend to FL320. I was the pilot monitoring. I did not [request priority handling] at this time because we received no EICAS messages or alerts telling us of this situation.

After rechecking the engine instruments and conferring with the pilot flying, I made the decision to shut down the engine inflight via the QRH Engine Failure/Shutdown Checklist.… I also made the decision that we would attempt to restart the engine because no limitations or engine parameters or engine vibrations were present or were exceeded. At this time we were about 20 minutes into the flight.… The inflight shutdown checklist was completed, and the engine inflight start checklist was completed. The engine started and accelerated normally,…and all parameters [remained within] limitations.… I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control…. After speaking with them and informing them of our situation and what transpired, I made the decision to continue to destination.

First Half of "Keep the M in MDA"
Keep the M in MDA  CRJ Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ [I] told him to stop the descent. We stopped 150 feet below the MDA, continued the approach, and landed. Looking back at the approach, I should have called for a missed approach and received vectors for another approach. The only reason for continuing was…poor judgment or just a bad decision at the time.
First Half of "An Approach to Remember"
An Approach to Remember  B737 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ [We] requested a 360 degree turn for our descent from the Tower. They approved us to maneuver either left or right as requested, and we initiated a go-around and a 360 degree left turn in VMC conditions. We initiated the go-around above 1,000 feet but descended slightly during the first part of the turn. I directed the FO to climb to 1,000 feet, which he slowly did. I had referenced the approach plate and noticed that the obstacles on the plate in our quadrant were at 487 feet and our climb ensured clearance from them. During the 360 [degree] maneuver, the FO lost sight of the airport, but I had it in sight and talked him through the turn back to the landing runway.

The FO completed the maneuver, but we were, again, not in a position to make a safe landing, as we were not well aligned with the landing runway.… We initiated another go-around, again getting approval to stay with Tower, but we maneuvered in a right hand pattern so the FO could see the runway in the turn. I directed a climb to 1,500 feet for the 579 foot towers west of the field. The FO…had lost sight of the field and wasn’t sure what maneuver we were doing while on downwind.… I had not adequately communicated my intentions for the pattern we were flying. We were maneuvering visually, so I took control of the aircraft and directed the FO to re-sequence the FMC…and extend the centerline. I completed the base and final turns and landed uneventfully on Runway 18.

The ASRS Database is a rich source of information for policy development, research, training, and more. Search ASRS Database »CALLBACK Issue 452 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS View ASRS Report Sets ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » July 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,224 General Aviation Pilots 1,261 Controllers 622 Flight Attendants 451 Military/Other 345 Mechanics 204 Dispatchers 179 TOTAL 8,286 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1 ATC Equipment or Procedure 1 TOTAL 2 NOTE TO READERS:  ■ or ■ Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 452

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Categories: News

CALLBACK 451 - August 2017

ASRS Callback - Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:27
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Issue 451 August 2017 In June 2016 the NTSB conducted a forum on Pilot Weather Reports (PIREPs) with the goal of “improving pilot weather report submission and dissemination to benefit safety in the National Airspace System” (NAS).1 To that end, pilots and dispatchers, ATC personnel, atmospheric scientists, and NWS meteorologists use PIREPs extensively in real time. All require good fidelity weather feedback to validate and optimize their products so that pilots have accurate foreknowledge of current weather conditions.

The NTSB’s Special Investigative Report1 (SIR) that documents the forum’s proceedings is comprehensive and makes for excellent reading. Many PIREP behind-the-scene needs are identified. Problem areas are diagnosed. Weaknesses in the PIREP system are pinpointed in categories of solicitation, submission, dissemination, and accuracy. Conclusions are drawn from top level philosophical thinking through component level hardware to enhance the PIREP system, and recommendations for improvement are prescribed.

ASRS presented data at this forum about reported incidents revealing complications with PIREPs that affected flight operations. ASRS reported incidents are offered this month to illustrate issues that were addressed by the NTSB’s recent PIREP forum and recorded in the associated SIR. What Did these Captains Really Mean? This air carrier Captain landed in actual conditions that did not mirror the Field Conditions Report (FICON). He made required PIREP reports, but challenged the aviation community to become better, more accurate reporters using standardized tools and appropriate descriptors.■ The Providence Field Condition (FICON) was 5/5/5 with thin snow, and ATIS was [reporting] 1/2 mile visibility with snow. The braking report from [the] previous B757 was good. Upon breaking out of the clouds, we saw an all-white runway with areas that looked as if they had previously been plowed in the center, but were now covered with snow. Landing occurred with autobrakes 3, but during rollout I overrode the brakes by gently pressing harder. However, no matter how hard I pressed on the brakes, the aircraft only gradually slowed down. Tower asked me if I could expedite to the end.… I said, “NO,” as the runway felt pretty slick to me. I reported medium braking both to the Tower and via ACARS to Dispatch. A follow-on light corporate commuter aircraft reported good braking.

I was a member of the Takeoff And Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) advisory group…and am intimately familiar with braking action physics as well as the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM). There was no way the braking was good or the snow was 1/8th inch or less in depth.

I would [suggest that] data…be collected from the aircraft…to analyze the aircraft braking coefficient.… It would also be of value to ascertain the delivered brake pressure versus the commanded pressure for this event, as there can sometimes be a large disparity in friction-limited landings. I think that pilots do not really know how to give braking action reports, and I don’t think the airport wanted to take my report of medium braking seriously. I also think pilots need to know how to use the RCAM to evaluate probable runway conditions that may differ from the FICON. Additionally, there is no such description as “thin” in the RCAM. None of the FAA Advisory Circulars that include the RCAM have thin snow as part of depth description. Don’t Wait to Disseminate; Automate A Phoenix Tower Controller experienced and identified a common problem while disseminating an URGENT PIREP. He offers a potential solution, technique, and rationale.
■ While working Clearance Delivery, I received an URGENT PIREP via Flight Data Input/Output General Information (FDIO GI) message stating, “URGENT PIREP...DRO [location] XA30Z [time] 140 [altitude] BE40 [type] SEV RIME ICING….” This was especially important to me to have this information since we have several flights daily going to Durango, Colorado. My technique would be to not only make a blanket transmission about the PIREP, but also specifically address flights going to that location to advise them and make sure they received the information. The issue is that…I did not receive this URGENT PIREP until [1:20 after it had been reported]. Severe icing can cause an aircraft incident or accident in a matter of moments. It is unacceptable that it takes one hour and twenty minutes to disseminate this information.

[A] better PIREP sharing system [is needed.] PIREPs should be entered in AISR [Aeronautical Information System Replacement] immediately after receiving the report and should automatically be disseminated to facilities within a specified radius without having to be manually entered again by a Traffic Management Unit or Weather Contractor, etc.
Informing the Intelligent Decision This C402 Pilot encountered icing conditions in conjunction with a system failure. Teamwork and accurate PIREPs allowed him to formulate a plan, make an informed decision, and successfully complete his flight.
■ During my descent I was assigned 6,000 feet by Approach.… I entered a layer of clouds about 8,000 feet. I turned on the aircraft’s anti-icing equipment. I leveled at 6,000 feet and noticed the propeller anti-ice [ammeter] was indicating that the equipment was not operational. I looked at the circuit breaker and saw that the right one was popped.

I informed ATC of my equipment failure. Approach requested and received a PIREP from traffic ahead of me indicating that there was ice in the clouds, but the bases were about 5,500 to 5,000 feet. Some light mixed ice was developing on my airframe. My experience [with] the ice that day was mostly light [with] some pockets of moderate around 5,000 to 6,000 feet. I informed [Dispatch] of my situation and elected to continue to [my destination] as I was close to the bottom of the icing layer, and a climb through it to divert would have prolonged exposure to the ice.
If the Controller’s Away, the Pilots Can Stray This Tower Controller experienced a situation that resulted in a hazard. He identified a potential risk associated with a Controller entering a new PIREP into AISR.
■ I was working alone in the tower cab, all combined Tower and Approach positions, at the beginning of a midshift. Weather had been moving through the area with gusty winds and precipitation in the area.… Aircraft X checked [in while] descending via the SADYL [arrival] and immediately reported moderate turbulence.

I issued a clearance to…JIMMI as a vector for sequencing with a descent to 9,000 feet. The instruction was read back correctly, and I observed Aircraft X turn left toward the fix and continue descending. I obtained some additional information from Aircraft X concerning the turbulence. At that point I went to the computer in the back of the room and logged on to the AISR website to enter a PIREP for the moderate turbulence. After successfully [completing that task,] …I walked back to the radar scope and observed Aircraft X descending through 8,000 feet. I instructed them to climb to 9,000 feet. The Pilot replied that they were descending to 6,000 feet. I again instructed them to climb to 9,000 feet and informed them that they were in a 9,000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) area. They began climbing and reached approximately 8,400 feet before they crossed into a 7,000 foot MVA [area.] The 6,000 foot altitude is the final altitude on the arrival, and I suspect they missed entering the new altitude into the FMS.

The responsibility to enter the PIREP into AISR instead of transmitting it verbally to FSS resulted in my being away from the radar scope as the aircraft descended through their assigned altitude.… [We should] return the responsibility of computer based PIREP entry to FSS to allow Controllers to focus on the operation.
The Effective Party-Line PIREP A B787 Crew experienced a severe, unexpected weather phenomenon that had not been forecast. Their situation and immediate actions illustrate the importance of both the PIREP process and the pilot response that it demands.
■ The [aural] warning…sounded like the autopilot disconnect button. We immediately looked at the instruments and noticed that the airspeed was in the red zone and our altitude was off by -500 feet. The Captain reduced the throttles, but airspeed continued to increase, so [he] opened the speed brakes slightly. I noticed that yellow slash bars were indicated on both LNAV and VNAV. I told the Captain, “No LNAV or VNAV, engines look fine.” The Captain disconnected the autopilot while continuing to get the airspeed under control and regain our altitude back to FL380. I reset the flight directors, selected Heading Select, and set V/S to +300. I reengaged LNAV/VNAV and informed the Captain that these systems were available.…

…We were both stunned as to what had happened because the ride was smooth and had no bumps or chop at all. I immediately got on the radio and told another aircraft behind us (one that we had been communicating with and passing PIREP information) that we had just experienced something very erratic and strange. As I was making this call, a printer message came across the printer about a B777 that had experienced severe wave turbulence at FL350 in the same vicinity as [our encounter.] I relayed this information to the aircraft behind us. They informed us that, yes, they had just encountered the same and gained 1,000 feet and 50 knots. There were other aircraft in the area who later confirmed that they experienced the same wave, however were better prepared to handle it due to our detailed PIREPs, and [those crews] were very appreciative.

We sent a message to Dispatch. Dispatch did not show any unusual activity such as horizontal windshear or unusual jet streams in the area and was…surprised to get our [PIREP].
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 451 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » June 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,194 General Aviation Pilots 1,246 Controllers 593 Flight Attendants 429 Military/Other 405 Mechanics 223 Dispatchers 154 TOTAL 8,244 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1 Airport Facility or Procedure 1 Company Policy 1 TOTAL 3 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 451
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Categories: News

AEPC™ and PAMA announce the creation of a scholarship program for aircraft maintenance technicians

AskBob News - Mon, 10/16/2017 - 11:31

Today, AeroEngine Protection Corp (AEPC™) and the Professional Aviation Maintenance Association (PAMA) announced the formation of a scholarship program for individuals interested in a career as an aircraft maintenance technician. Aircraft maintenance technicians are the lifeline of the aviation industry as they are responsible for keeping aircraft flying by maintaining the aircraft to the safety standards mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). As more aircraft are produced over the next several years, the need for qualified aircraft maintenance technicians will continue to grow exponentially.  READ MORE 

Categories: News, US

Aviation MX Human Factors Sept 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 10/16/2017 - 11:15

The September 2017 issue of Aviation MX Human Factors is now available here

Inside this issue

by Dr. Bill Johnson & Marc Szepan


Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA Realigns Flight Standards

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 10/06/2017 - 11:46

On August 20, Flight Standards transitioned its management structure from the traditional geography-based regional structure to a functional structure. The new functional structure aligns our leadership in four areas: Air Carrier Safety Assurance, General Aviation Safety Assurance, Safety Standards, and Foundational Business.

This structural realignment should be completely transparent to you. We have “erased” the geographic boundaries and aligned our reporting and management practices according to function, but you will not see any structural change to the local FAA offices who serve you today.

What you should see, though, is continuing improvement in how those offices operate. As I have said many times to our employees, our structural changes are important, and they are the most visible part of our Future of Flight Standards transition. But structural change won’t do much for us without the essential cultural changes at both the individual and organizational levels. For several years now, we have been stressing the importance of interdependence, critical thinking, and consistency in our workforce, and these behavioral attributes and competencies are now embedded in each Flight Standards Service employee’s work requirements. At the organizational level, the ongoing culture change includes training managers in the competencies of change management, and the "coach approach" to leadership, which is about helping employees by expanding awareness and sharing experience.

With our less-tangible but absolutely critical culture changes well underway, we were finally in a position to benefit from the structural realignment. The organizational intent of the shift to functional organization is to increase efficiency, eliminate multiple interfaces, and integrate surveillance activities, and to improve our performance in several areas:

Accountability to Flying Public, Stakeholders

  • Meet the needs of a constantly and rapidly changing industry
  • Fix/prevent issues with consistency and standardization in regulatory interpretation

Budget Constraints

  • Balance allocation of resources
  • Increase efficient use of personnel and travel funds
  • Reduce redundancy in regions

Change Readiness to Meet Constant Stream of New Challenges

  • Operational agility, efficiency, and effectiveness
  • Consistent service and performance

Decision-Making – e.g., Risk-Based Decision-Making Strategic Initiative

  • Culture and structure that facilitate effective implementation of risk-based decision-making, including Compliance Philosophy

You can probably see how our cultural and structural changes are mutually reinforcing, and how both aspects of the transition contribute to a Flight Standards Service with greater accountability, better use of resources, and change readiness. So the change we do want you to notice is what we have already been hearing from some of our industry stakeholders. From my vantage point, the conversation with industry has changed for the better. Our stakeholders are noticing that we are responding in a different way, with a greater amount of service, and with better care and quality. I hope and expect that your experiences with Flight Standards will be similar.

I also hope and expect that you will also see us continue to improve. You’ve probably heard it said that “the future is now.” What that means to me – and for the FAA Flight Standards Service as a healthy organization – is that the future is the result of what we do right now. So I want to see us get better still at practicing our new cultural norms, and creating a Flight Standards Service that is truly agile, efficient, and consistent in our service to you. We owe you that, we are ready to deliver.

John Duncan is the Executive Director of the FAA Flight Standards Service.

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Air France explores blockchain potential for aircraft maintenance processes

AskBob News - Fri, 10/06/2017 - 10:39

Air France is exploring blockchain potential for the management of replacement parts on in-service airplanes, Aviation Today reported.

Air France KLM’s engineering and maintenance division is using its MRO Lab to experiment with the technology. The airlines uses MRO Lab to collaborate with universities, manufacturers and software developers to work on innovative ideas for the aviation industry.

James Kornberg, director of innovation of the Air France KLM business unit, said that his team is seeking to establish a clear blockchain business case for improving maintenance processes and work flows.

Read More

Categories: News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of Sep 18, 2017 – Sep 24, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 09/25/2017 - 11:08

Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update 

AD Issued for Ameri-King ELTs

The FAA this week published an Airworthiness Directive (AD 2017-16-01) to detect and correct certain non-functioning Ameri-King Corporation model AK 450 and 451 emergency locator transmitters (ELTs). The AD, which affects 14,500 ELTs installed on various aircraft of U.S. registry, was prompted by multiple failure reports. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the ELT for discrepancies; repetitive checks, tests, and verifications, as applicable, to ensure the ELT is functioning; and corrective actions if necessary. For more details, you can view the full AD at

Returning to Flight

Has it been sometime since you last kicked the tires and lit the fires? Then have a look at our #FlySafe topic of the month flyer for September ( which focuses on returning to flight after a period of inactivity. It will help you formulate a game plan you can use to safely get back to enjoying the freedom only flying can offer.

AirVenture Forum Videos Now Online

If you missed AirVenture this year, you can still check out all the FAA safety forums on YouTube. See presentations on BasicMed and ACS, for example, on the FAA’s AirVenture safety forum playlist at:

NTSB Issues Safety Alerts for Carbon Monoxide Poisoning

The National Transportation Safety Board issued two safety alerts Wednesday to increase awareness among aircraft mechanics and pilots of the risk of carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning. Safety Alerts SA-070 ( and SA-069 ( warn mechanics and pilots that the risk of CO poisoning is generally overlooked and underestimated. A defect or leak in the exhaust pipes or muffler can introduce the colorless, odorless and tasteless gas into the cockpit – with sometimes fatal results. The NTSB also produced companion videos for the alerts, available on the NTSB’s YouTube channel at and

Flight Instructor Refresher

The September/October 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing ( explores the critical role flight instructors play in keeping the National Airspace System safe. Feature articles focus on flight instructor requirements and best practices, as well as the many tools and educational resources that can help sharpen your teaching skills. For a good overview of tools and tips, check out the article “Flight Instructor Resources: Your Guide to Lifelong Learning.” To read this article on a mobile device, go to


Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors,
Address questions or comments to:
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA announces the selection of the Division Managers

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 08/31/2017 - 10:25

The FSLB are thrilled to announce a major milestone in the evolution of Flight Standards: the selection of the Division Managers. 

 As you know, the organizational intent of our restructuring is to facilitate and accelerate the evolution of Flight Standards as an agile, efficient, and consistent organization. Leadership is one of the keys to successful change, so we invested a great deal of time and effort in making these selections. Just to recap, we used a three-level interview process to help us identify leaders who have the right mindset, which includes awareness of, and commitment to, our new direction. The interviews were also intended to help us determine where these leaders best fit in the new organization. To be sure, the interview and selection process was extremely rigorous. The process demonstrated that we have many potential leaders within the Flight Standards service. 

With that background in mind, we are proud to announce that we have selected the following leaders to serve in the Division Manager positions in the new Flight Standards Service structure:

 Air Carrier Safety Assurance

            George Wadsworth, Air Carrier A

            Beth Babb, Air Carrier B

            Alan Stephens, Air Carrier C

            Dennis Hill, Air Carrier D 

            Max Tidwell, Air Carrier E

            Thomas Stachiw, Air Carrier F


 General Aviation Safety Assurance

            Thomas Malone, General Aviation A 135

            Roberto Gonzalez, General Aviation B 135

            Clint Wease, General Aviation C 135

            Angelina Mack, General Aviation D 135

            Wayne Fry, General Aviation E 135

            Mark Kramer, General Aviation F

            Hardie DeGuzman, General Aviation G

            Mike Bossert, General Aviation H


Safety Standards

Jeffery Phipps, Aircraft Evaluation

Jodi Baker, Air Transportation

Jackie Black, Aircraft Maintenance

Bradley Palmer, General Aviation & Com.

Elizabeth Kearns, Safety Analysis & Promo.

Robert Ruiz, International

Mark Steinbicker, Flight Technologies

Van Kerns, Regulatory Support


 Foundational Business

            Mark Hopkins, Business Standards

            Augusto Casado, Resource Management A

            Vincent Chirasello, Resource Management B

            Kawehi Lum, Safety Risk Management

            Bobby Hedlund, Workforce Development

            Debra Entricken, Civil Aviation Registry


 As you are aware, Kawehi and Jodi are acting Deputy Directors and Auggie Casado is on military leave.  We have asked the following individuals to be acting Division Managers:


Steve Moates: Air Transportation

Andrew Estrada: Resource Management A

Justin Bouchard: Safety Risk Management


Again, we chose these leaders for their mindset, their awareness of our new direction, and their commitment to leading this crucial change. Please join us in congratulating them and help us in supporting them as we continue the evolution of Flight Standards. 

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Flight Standards Service Realignment to Strengthen Relationships

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 08/24/2017 - 10:01

“It’s been a long time coming, but we’re finally on the threshold of the initial Future of Flight Standards realignment. The Directors and Deputy Directors have been deeply involved in planning for that realignment,” said Executive Director John Duncan.

In anticipation of the realignment, Duncan invited new Directors Rick Domingo, Larry Fields, Bruce DeCleene and Tim Miller to join him in discussing some of the changes in the organization.

“For many of you, these leaders are familiar names and faces. I assure you, they come to us with a new mindset. We’ve developed that mindset through the cultural changes that have occurred in Flight Standards. I can’t overstress that the culture change is what’s important. The structural change facilitates that culture change,” said Duncan.

“A big part of that change is strengthening our team relationships. We need to learn how to think and act like a solid team across the Flight Standards Service,” said Larry Fields, the new Director of General Aviation Safety Assurance.       

“Actually, that’s where the new mindset plays a very important role. Through the issues of realign­ment, and the questions, it gives us plenty of opportunity to practice mutual learning behaviors,” said Tim Miller, newly appointed Director of Air Carrier Safety Assurance.

The intent of the shift remains the same—a healthy Flight Standards organization that is agile, efficient and delivers a consistent product to the public.

“We’re working interdependently, as a team. We’re applying critical thinking to those chal­lenges and issues to help the service be more agile and efficient,” said Bruce DeCleene, the new Director of Foundational Business.

While there are a lot of moving parts, there’s a lot of hard work going on behind the scenes. Duncan emphasizes that the team should expect anomalies in procedures and processes as well as some possible confusion.

However, Duncan said, “Here’s where I get to be Gene Krantz in Apollo 13: Failure is not an option. If you don’t have the answer to a stakeholder’s question, our new culture is to work the problem aggressively, enthusias­tically, and interdependently — and then respond in a timely way.”

“And let me say this up front, we are all still learning how to think and act in different ways,” added Rick Domingo, the new Director of Safety Standards.

Overall, there has been a good deal of progress made in this transition and the team is very excited about approaching this milestone in the realignment plan.

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

It's not too late to reserve your ADS-B Rebate! NavWorx avionics now eligible!

FAA & FAASTeam News - Tue, 08/22/2017 - 12:41

Notice Number: NOTC7328

Attention pilots and aircraft owners:  The ADS-B Rebate Program will now allow aircraft owners with NavWorx ADS600-B avionics, part numbers 200-0012/0013, to apply for a rebate.

To be eligible, rebate applicants who purchased and installed these NavWorx units after September 19, 2016 must comply with section (e)(1)(iv) of the recent Airworthiness Directive (AD 2017-11-11), or use an FAA-approved Alternative Method of Compliance. 

The FAA is offering a $500 rebate for new ADS-B installations in fixed-wing, single-engine piston aircraft.  The last day to make a rebate reservation is September 18, 2017, if reservations are still available. Once the reservation is established, you will still have up to 150 days to complete the remaining steps in the process.

Are you eligible for a rebate? Please visit for details.

Questions?  For questions about the ADS-B rebate program, please contact

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of Aug 07, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 08/10/2017 - 10:04

FAA Safety Team | Safer Skies Through Education

SUBJECT LINE: FAAST Blast – Flight Standards Reorg, ADS-B Rebate, Avoiding Pilot Deviations, Human Errors Happen
Notice Number: NOTC7313

FAAST Blast — Week of Aug 07, 2017 – Aug 13, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

Flight Standards Service Reorganization

The FAA has published an Information for Operators bulletin (InFO 17010) to inform industry about the Future of Flights Standards (FFS) Initiative. FFS is a service-wide cultural and structural realignment intended to ensure that Flight Standards provides agile, efficient, and consistent service to the aviation community. The forthcoming structural realignment will support the ongoing culture change by eliminating redundancies and shifting from the traditional geography-based structure to a function-based organization. The new structure will enable Flight Standards to provide faster response times, single points of accountability in each functional organization, greater agility, and consistency.

For more details, click here. Be sure to also check future issues of FAA Safety Briefing for more information.

Act Now for ADS-B Rebates

The FAA’s $500 rebate for completed ADS-B installations in fixed-wing, single-engine piston aircraft is ending soon. The last day to apply for a rebate is September 18, 2017. Act now to see if you are eligible. Visit

Tips for Avoiding Pilot Deviations

Runway safety is a top priority for all pilots. Download our FlySafe fact sheet today at for important tips on how to avoid pilot deviations. Check out the video, “Pilot Deviation Safety” on YouTube at Produced by the FAASTeam, this video discusses aerial and ground pilot deviations and how to prevent them. It’s part of the FAASTeam’s GA safety video series called "Let's Take a Minute for Safety." Take a minute to watch these short videos to learn more about loss of control safety.

Errare Humanum Est

            As a pilot, have you ever skipped a weather briefing? Rushed a preflight? Skipped a checklist? If the answer is yes, you’ll want to read this: “Errare Humanum Est – To Err is Human” in the July/Aug issue of FAA Safety Briefing ( You can download the entire issue here at


Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors,
Address questions or comments to:
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or


Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Future of FAA Flight Standards Progress

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 08/03/2017 - 10:31

Hi, folks -


We are now just over two weeks away from the Future of Flight Standards realignment, so it is a very exciting and busy time. Our new leadership team is working hard to make the process as smooth as possible and, most importantly, to minimize any risk to our Continued Operational Safety mission.


Here’s a quick summary of what’s happening:


  • Interviews for the vacant Division Manager positions are underway and will be completed later this week. Along with the Directors and Deputy Directors, John B, Mike Z and I will make selections by August 18. The normal HR processes may take a few days, but we do expect to have most if not all of the Division Managers in place shortly after our August 20 transition date.


  • The Directors are holding virtual meetings this week with employees in the four new functional areas. Please remember, though, that our organizational intent is to not create four new silos. Interdependence and horizontal communication are essential. Regardless of your assigned functional area, your work with the other three needs to be as open and seamless as possible.


If you are moving to a new organization, you can expect to receive a communication in the next few days. This message will address where you will be in the organization and to whom you will report. As we’ve stated before, no one will move, lose pay, or change job duties.


  • We plan to establish a Rapid Response Team that will enable you to ask questions, raise problems or concerns, or direct external customers as we near the transition. We will provide details later.


A great number of people have worked hard to make this transition as smooth and as organized as possible. No matter how hard we try, though, change on this magnitude is challenging and there will be bumps in the road. If you encounter one of those bumps, please treat it as an opportunity to use horizontal communication and interdependence to get past it.  Elevate issues to your supervisor as needed. Together, we will make it all work.


Thanks for all the great work and support. I hope you are as excited as I am in the final approach to this major milestone in our ongoing Future of Flight Standards journey.



John Duncan

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US